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ABSTRACT 
 
Metacognitive Dimensions of Adolescents’ Intellectual Collaboration 
Nicole Zillmer 
 
Children's interaction with peers supports cognitive development in numerous ways. The claim 
investigated in the present study is that these benefits include support at a metacognitive level 
that children provide one another, specifically in the form of meta-level speech aimed at regulat-
ing the other's behavior.  This proposition originates in Vygotsky's views of a bi-directional zone 
of proximal development between peers with resulting transfer from inter-mental to intra-mental 
planes. Sixty-four 7th graders participated in the study. Students who shared a position on a so-
cial issue engaged in electronic dialogs with a succession of pairs who held an opposing position. 
In one condition (Stay), students worked with the identical same-side partner over six twice-
weekly dialog sessions. In the other condition (Switch), students worked with a new same-side 
partner at each session.  Students experienced both conditions, half of them first the Stay condi-
tion and then, discussing a new topic, the Switch condition.  Condition order was reversed for the 
other half of participants. Students engaged in more frequent meta-talk in the Stay than the 
Switch condition; Stay conversations contained more frequent regulatory utterances than Switch 
conversations and a greater proportion of planning statements.  Electronic dialogs produced in 
the Stay condition contained a higher proportion of meta-talk than those produced in the Switch 
condition; however, differences favoring the Stay condition in direct counterargument use were 
found at only one of two data collection points. On the whole, differences suggest that collabora-
tors scaffolded one another’s meta-level development through regulatory conversation that 
   
evolved over time as collaborators developed their relationships, and that, for Stay pairs, this 
evolving shared regulatory talk extended to the electronic discourse. There was no consistent ev-
idence, however, that this success extended to argument strategies on the discourse task. 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 Conventional wisdom, as well as a substantial amount of research literature, holds that 
collaborative activity between children is beneficial to their cognitive development (Blumenfeld, 
et. al, 1996; Dillenbourg, Blaye, & O’Malley, 1996; Bearison & Dorval, 2002; Howe, 2010). 
However, while the research literature dedicated to the effects of collaborative cognition among 
children is vast, it is also somewhat inconclusive in terms of how and when, precisely, children 
benefit from collaborative activities. Whether collaborative activities are beneficial may depend 
upon participant age, ability level, or whether and how partners differ on these variables 
(Azmitia, 1998; Kuhn & Pease, 2009), while others studies suggest no suggest such prerequisites 
to positive effects (Barron, 2003; Kuhn, Zillmer, Crowell, & Zavala, 2013). How these variables 
matter may depend upon the focus of the collaborative activity itself (Rogoff 1996). Same-age, 
same ability pairs appear to benefit more from collaboration during activities promoting concep-
tual change than those focused on lower-order outcomes like rote memorization (Phelps & Da-
mon, 1989). The need for collaborators, during the former type of activity, to develop a shared 
understanding of problem referents has been suggested as an explanatory factor in individuals’ 
enhanced performance (Schwartz, 1995). Yet, not all concept- or problem-focused activities typ-
ically thought to derive their positive effects from such active collaboration actually do so; for 
example, during problem-based learning, individuals appear to benefit intellectually just as much 
as collaborating participants during problem-based learning (Wirkala & Kuhn, 2011). On the 
other hand, argumentive activities involving a collaborative component (e.g., dialog argumenta-
tion) do appear to impart greater intellectual benefits to participants than do individual argument 
activities (e.g., expository writing assignments); it has been suggested that this benefit may arise 
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from the inherent demand that, in this context, participants acknowledge and actively coordinate 
opposing perspectives in order to complete their task (Kuhn & Moore, 2015). This conclusion 
aligns with work suggesting that young collaborators benefit most when they are required to di-
rectly attend to (Forman & Cazden, 1985) and even extend their partners’ positions (Bearison & 
Dorval, 2002). It may be that where collaboration exerts its most significant benefits, therefore, 
is in the meta-level demands it places on children in attempting to fulfill these interpersonal task 
goals.  Research on children’s collaborative metacognition is currently in its infancy, although 
several exploratory studies suggest a useful framework for understanding its utility and how it 
unfolds.      
 In this chapter, we first review cognitive developmental literature to define more explicit-
ly the meta-level skills that children stand to gain from their intellectual collaboration with one 
another. Next, we examine frameworks for understanding the mechanisms by which peer collab-
oration may exert its cognitive benefits. The claim investigated in the present study is that these 
benefits include support at a metacognitive level that children provide one another, specifically 
in the form of meta-level speech aimed at regulating one another’s behavior.  This proposition 
originates in Vygotsky's (1978) views of a bi-directional zone of proximal development between 
peers with resulting transfer from inter-mental to intra-mental planes. 
 
Why Study Metacognition? 
 The complaint that the American educational system is failing its students is not new. 
One need pay only cursory attention to the news – or to everyday conversation among laypersons 
– to learn that our system lags behind those of other developed nations in terms of achievement, 
graduation rates, and generally, enthusiasm for continued learning. Unfortunately, much empiri-
cal evidence substantiates these claims (National Center for Education Statistics, 2011; Salahu-
   
 3 
Din, D., Persky, H., and Miller, J., 2012). Although college attendance rates have risen in the 
past few decades, at least 20% of first-year students require remedial coursework (National Cen-
ter for Education Statistics, 2013), and college completion rates have not risen to match in-
creased attendance (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009). The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) finds that, on the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA), US high school students fall below the international average on mathematical and read-
ing tasks generally, and rank among the lowest countries in terms of performance on math and 
reading tasks requiring higher-order problem solving and critical analysis (Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, 2013). Given students' poor performance internationally, 
state standards in place since authorization of NCLB in 2001 were clearly insufficient to prepare 
all students for success. But where, exactly, does the current educational system fail? What are 
the essential skills that laypersons and experts alike suspect students should, but do not, attain, 
despite national efforts to improve achievement? 
 Kuhn (1991, 2005) proposed that schools’ traditional emphasis on building children’s 
knowledge bases, while perhaps well-intentioned, may be misguided to the extent that such a fo-
cus precludes the development of sound thinking skills.  Rather than engaging children in activi-
ties supporting such development, educators historically emphasized production of “correct” an-
swers that students must articulate to the satisfaction of an expert (Kuhn, 2005; Berland & Rei-
ser, 2008). Paradoxically, an overvaluing of relativistic tolerance for all opinions – perhaps 
stemming from societal emphasis on individualism – serves to stifle the development of reasoned 
thought (Kuhn, 1991). With no basis to understand what rational, evaluative thought is or that it 
matters, thinking well holds little intrinsic motivation.  Learning becomes a tool to accumulate 
facts in pursuit of some secondary end, but it is not an activity having intrinsic value. 
   
 4 
 Few would argue that a strict focus on fact accumulation, particularly if divorced from 
any attention to intellectual skill development, is adequate to prepare students for life in the 21st 
Century.   The claim that students should exit the education system equipped to think well has 
gained much popular support in recent years. While a survey of educational experts’ definitions 
of necessary 21st Century skills (Education Week, 2010) turns up a wide range of constructs 
(from digital literacy to civic responsibility, intellectual risk-taking to self-discipline), a theme 
emerges; whether parsed as the need to “know how to learn,” to “be able to develop one’s mind,” 
or to “think critically,” students should leave school able to take control of their own knowledge 
acquisition and decision making in a world marked by an ever-expanding base of readily-
accessed information (credible or not) and by ever-evolving intellectual and professional prob-
lems and tools. Students must therefore understand how and in what contexts to choose to use 
their skills; further, they must understand how to use them in concert with other humans in an 
increasingly connected and collaborative world. 
 That one’s educational values are likely susceptible to the influence of the society within 
which one matures (Kuhn & Park, 2005) is potentially a double-edged sword, as evidenced by 
the current state of our education system and its outcomes. Fortunately, however, if that society 
is one that endorses the value of self-directed intellectual engagement, this means that such an 
appreciation potentially can also be transmitted to its youngest citizens.  This also means that it 
becomes critical to more precisely define what this valued intellectual engagement should look 
like. What does it mean to be a self-directed learner? A critical thinker? And how can these de-
sired outcomes be achieved?  
 Critical thinking skills have been included as desired outcomes and operationalized, at 
least generally, in the now widely adopted (although perhaps endangered) Common Core State 
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Standards. For example, by the end of the middle school years, students must be able to “Write 
arguments to support claims with clear reasons and relevant evidence … Introduce claim(s), 
acknowledge and distinguish the claim(s) from alternate or opposing claims, and organize the 
reasons and evidence logically … Support claim(s) with logical reasons and relevant evidence, 
using accurate, credible sources and demonstrating an understanding of the topic or text” (Na-
tional Governors Association, 2010). Proficiency in scientific reasoning requires that students 
leaving middle school be able to “use evidence from investigations in arguments that accept, re-
vise, or reject scientific models.” 
To date, student performance in the above-described skill areas has stagnated and in some 
cases has even declined.  While performance gaps exist by gender and ethnicity, data collected 
by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) suggest that a significant majority 
of students in the US typically do not receive adequate instruction to achieve benchmarks speci-
fied by the new Common Core standards. Just a quarter of high school seniors graduating in 
2011 achieved proficiency in persuasive writing, and barely over half of eighth graders and 
twelfth graders performed at even the basic level (Salahu-Din, D., Persky, H., and Miller, J., 
2012). The news is hardly better with regard to scientific reasoning. Here, just 30% of 8th graders 
and 21% of 12th graders met critical benchmarks for proficiency in 2009 (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2011A).  
While there is a relatively new consensus among educators regarding what critical think-
ing skills might generally look like in application (e.g., differentiating claims from alternative 
ones, distinguishing claims from evidence, and using evidence to inform theories), there is no 
such consensus concerning how the desired skills should be taught, in part because outcomes as 
they are specified have not been purposefully grounded in scientific understanding of cognitive 
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development.  Potentially concerning are current efforts to introduce so-called “critical-thinking” 
curricula that are not based on empirical evidence regarding cognitive development, but rather 
serve influential special interests. The American Legislative Exchange Council, for example, has 
produced model bills (adopted by four states and proposed in several others) requiring that public 
schools present students with “alternative” (read, nonscientific) theories alongside generally ac-
cepted scientific theories such as global climate change, in the interest of “[helping] students de-
velop critical thinking skills in order to become intelligent, productive, and scientifically in-
formed citizens.” Aside from objections that students will therefore be exposed to non-credible 
theories presented as credible evidence, such efforts assume that simply presenting students with 
two sides of a supposed debate will produce far-reaching intellectual effects. Research in cogni-
tive development has shown that the critical thinking skills described by the Common Core are 
attained by only a minority of humans, and are likely results of long-term exposure to both gen-
eral and specific learning experiences. Any responsible proponent of critical-thinking skill de-
velopment in the classroom should recognize and accept the fact that systematic investigation of 
those specific experiences remains nascent and requires better empirical documentation.  
To succeed, any intention to support the development of specific thinking skills should be 
based on empirical evidence that quality of thinking does, in fact, develop in the direction of our 
stated goals and is amenable to acceleration or improvement. Actual efforts to support them 
should likewise be based in theoretical and empirical understanding of the mechanisms that 
compel their development. What do we currently know about how skilled thinking develops? Do 
children think differently from adults (and do adults always reach a particular level of develop-
ment)? Do we know anything about the mechanisms that compel (or impede) development, and 
are they potentially susceptible to intervention?  
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Mounting evidence suggests that, with regard to higher order cognitive skills, children 
indeed differ from adults in predictable ways, and that they develop intellectually along a specif-
ic (although not inevitable) trajectory toward adulthood. Numerous theoretical frameworks in-
form inquiries into what intellectual developments occur (and why) over the lifespan — for ex-
ample, frameworks that attribute maturation to concept or knowledge acquisition, to enhanced 
information processing, or to a Piagetian stage-determined construction of successively new 
thought structures. Certainly, children do acquire new information (through schooling and eve-
ryday experience) throughout their development (and continue to do so as adults), and assuredly, 
information processing components such as working memory (Dempster, 1981; 1985), percep-
tion (Armstrong, Maurer, & Lewis, 2009), speed of processing (Kail, 1991; Fry & Hale, 2000; 
Luna, Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004), and inhibitory control (Harnishfeger, 1995; Lu-
na et. al, 2004; Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006) improve over the course of the 
developmental trajectory. A review of cognitive developmental literature, however, reveals that 
such explanatory frameworks are not enough, by themselves, to account for observed differences 
in the ways that children and adults learn about the world. Rather, developmental research on 
children and adults engaged in knowledge acquisition tasks implicates the existence of a meta-
level executive that strengthens as humans produce their own development toward adult-like 
cognitive, metacognitive, and epistemological endpoints. It may therefore be at this, the meta-
level, that intervention may have the most leverage. 
 
Knowledge acquisition studies show meta-level differences between children and adults.  
Kuhn and Pease (2006) engaged both 11-12-year-olds and young adults in an identical 
learning task, controlling for speed of processing and prior knowledge. Participants were asked 
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to make predictions about the potential causal effects of a set of variables, then were presented 
with a series of combinations of variables and their actual effects. Participants were to determine, 
given this information, which of the particular variables in question were, in fact, effective on 
their own. Though neither age group had prior knowledge of the material, both were obliged to 
make inferences regarding the effectiveness of variables. Kuhn and Pease found adults better 
able to accurately make the correct inferences, having learned the information conveyed.  Unsur-
prisingly, both age groups were more likely to err when presented information that contradicted 
prior expectations; more interestingly, this effect was especially pronounced for children, who 
had more difficulty keeping prior expectations from interfering with their interpretation of the 
new information. Kuhn & Pease interpret this difference, along with spontaneous justifications 
participants made for their final responses, to suggest that adults were better able to hold their 
expectations (or theories) as objects of their own reflection and therefore to consider how incom-
ing information might bear upon them. The ability to distance oneself from one’s own theories, 
the authors conclude, is a key metacognitive competency (Flavell, 1976) that develops during 
late childhood and adolescence and into adulthood.  It implicates the existence and growing po-
tency of a meta-level executive able to do the work of reflecting on theory and coordinating it 
with evidence.  
Earlier microgenetic studies of human knowledge acquisition likewise demonstrate exist-
ence of a strengthening executive during adolescence. Kuhn and colleagues (1995) asked chil-
dren and adults to examine any (of their choice) of a set of variables to identify causal relation-
ships. While both groups initially performed comparably well, using similar strategies of infer-
ence, and while both age groups made progress, adults showed greater strategic improvement 
over trials than children, who demonstrated greater difficulty relinquishing inferior strategies for 
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more effective ones, as well as monitoring and controlling the role of prior beliefs. Generally, 
microgenetic research demonstrates that as a learner gains experience within a particular domain 
(say, arithmetic or scientific inquiry), shifts from one stage of development to the next occur on-
ly as the learner gradually abandons less effective cognitive strategies for more advanced ones 
(Siegler & Crowley, 1991; Siegler, 1996; Kuhn, 2000). However, until the shift is complete, the 
individual continues to use multiple strategies of varying effectiveness contemporaneously, with 
development likely occurring, therefore, at the proposed executive or meta-level that governs 
strategy selection. Comparing children and adults in Kuhn and colleagues’ inferential inquiry 
task (1995) reveals the speedier work of executive processes at a metastrategic level: that is, 
adults demonstrated greater ability to reflect on the success of knowledge acquisition strategies 
currently in use and were better able to monitor and revise their strategies when their experience 
warranted it.  
The proposed growth of an executive, while not uncontested (see Siegler, 1996), aligns 
with contemporary research on brain imaging studies linking activity throughout the frontal cor-
tex with executive attention and metacognitive regulation (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 
2000; Shimamura, 2000), and with research on developments in the brain and executive func-
tioning during childhood (Marcovitch et. al, 2008; Sodian & Frith, 2008) and adolescence (An-
drews-Hana et. al, 2011).  Adults demonstrate greater magnitude of activity in prefrontal regions 
than adolescents do during tasks requiring inhibition of prepotent responses (Andrews-Hana et. 
al, 2011), potentially a contributing factor in adults’ greater ability to suspend prior theories 
while considering alternatives (Kuhn, 2006) or to inhibit old strategies in favor of ones that may 
be more suitable to task demands. Importantly, adults show increased difficulty during set-
switching tasks when trials are accelerated, suggesting that though they may never completely 
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outgrow childhood cognitive and perceptual biases (Diamond & Kirkham, 2005), adults’ typical-
ly superior performance relative to children’s indicates stronger top-down management of those 
biases.  
 With regard to knowledge acquisition generally, both metacognitive competencies (the 
ability to reflect on one’s theories) and metastrategic competencies are observed to develop 
gradually toward an adult endpoint; the two dimensions are complementary and necessary to the 
achievement of a fully mature epistemic ideal, where the adult is capable of coordinating theory 
and evidence consciously and at will. There is individual variation, however, in terms of just how 
far meta-level competencies develop, particularly with regard to the metacognitive ability to dis-
tance oneself from and hold one’s theories as objects of reflection. This variability has profound 
implications for where the learner “arrives” in terms of his or her personal epistemology — that 
is, what the learner understands about knowledge and the process of coming to know, generally, 
and what the learner understands about how he or she has come to know anything specifically.  
 Epistemological understanding is rooted in early developments in Theory of Mind 
(ToM), wherein the learner - about age 4 - first comes to attribute mental states to others. While 
nearly all humans (save autistic children) acquire the ability to attribute false beliefs to others, 
how far children progress along an epistemological trajectory is highly variable, suggesting that 
while early meta-level processes (or the executive functions that precede and compel them) op-
erate relatively uniformly, some differences in the developmental process must be observable 
between individuals along the entire trajectory. Next, we describe the epistemological trajectory 
along with the furthest endpoint observed in only some percentage of the population. 
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Epistemological development and metacognition 
 Research conducted by Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000) has shown that thinkers 
reliably shift from a pre-absolutist epistemology in early childhood (characterized by a total lack 
of differentiation between thought and the external world; facts are copies of the external world 
rather than products of the mind, and false beliefs are therefore impossible) to an absolutist epis-
temology at about the age of 4 (people may have potentially correctable false beliefs, but 
knowledge still emanates from an external source; facts are directly knowable beyond a doubt). 
During adolescence, many typically reach a multiplist epistemology, where they have come to 
regard the mind itself as the source of knowledge.  
 While the multiplist has succeeded in recognizing the subjective element of knowing, a 
new and more difficult challenge now awaits her if she is to enter the final stage: at the multiplist 
stage, all knowledge is completely subjective, no claim or opinion more valuable or right than 
any other. Her next task is to reintegrate the objective element of knowing into her epistemology 
- she must recognize that standards may exist (e.g., quality of evidence) that bear upon and quali-
fy her theories or claims, such that some may contain more merit than others. It is far less fre-
quently that humans progress to this final evaluativist stage, where the thinker distinguishes con-
sistently between claims and evidence. Before reaching this point, the thinker tends to accept ex-
planations of why a theory might be true as sufficient support for that theory – particularly if that 
explanation elaborates or protects a theory she already endorses — only inconsistently recogniz-
ing the distinction between explanation and supporting evidence, if at all. Moving past this stage 
implies a strong and consistent meta-level ability to so distinguish these two elements of know-
ing; such an achievement indicates that the knower has relinquished the absolutist’s need to align 
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theory and evidence. Further, it implies the conscious recognition that beliefs are not merely cre-
ated in the mind but are also objectively falsifiable (even if currently supported), and that this 
falsifiability makes scrutiny meaningful. When this recognition is explicit, the thinker has argua-
bly gained metacognitive control over her own knowledge acquisition strategies. She is able to 
hold her own and others’ thoughts as objects of her reflection and to evaluate the merits of both 
(Kuhn, 2001). Thus at this stage, the thinker has moved beyond seeing evaluation as an exercise 
in futility.  
 Research by King and Kitchener (1994), who proposed a similar (though more graduat-
ed) seven-stage “reflective judgment” model (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), suggests that even ad-
vanced undergraduate students barely attain a “quasi-reflective” stage roughly equivalent to the 
multiplist one described by Kuhn et al. (2000). In fact, only at the later stages of graduate study 
did thinkers in the King and Kitchener study consistently exhibit evaluative thought. Further, at-
tainment of the third epistemological stage (possible within the realms of aesthetics, values, and 
truth) was far less likely to occur than the earlier shift to multiplism. Like King & Kitchener, 
Kuhn et al. (2000) find that higher education does correlate with more advanced development, 
but that no age group comprised only fully absolutist, multiplist, or evaluativist thinkers across 
all domains; in fact, even the most highly educated participants (PhD students) maintained mul-
tiplist (and in a few cases even absolutist) tendencies.  
 Kuhn et al. (2000) also report that professional, college-educated adults in the workforce 
– while faring more favorably than some groups – appeared on the whole to be less intellectually 
sophisticated than younger, current undergraduate students. One might speculate that current en-
gagement in some college-related practice may be important to sustained, advanced metacogni-
tive control, or that the undergraduates in this study had a very particular experience not general-
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izable to the entire professional, college-graduate population, but these possibilities are specula-
tive. Of greatest concern here is that, empirically speaking, development does appear to follow a 
predictable trajectory (in general from absolutist to multiplist, and then under certain conditions, 
to evaluativist thinking), and that these attainments appear supported by a strong meta-level ex-
ecutive. Yet, an unfortunately large number of thinkers do not achieve advanced epistemological 
understanding. They remain, to some degree, unaware of why they hold the beliefs that they do 
and likely attain only limited control over their own knowledge acquisition strategies 
 If even mature, relatively well-educated adults struggle with gaining consistent, con-
scious control over their own thinking, can we hope to support the development of anyone of any 
age or education level? What is the experience of those thinkers who do get there without “inter-
vention,” if it is not a typical college education? How to support meta-level control over one’s 
own thinking, of course, depends upon what kind of thinking is targeted. If the kind of thinking 
we wish to support entails contemplating and evaluating one’s own theories, reflecting on alter-
natives, and considering the relative merits of evidence that bears upon them (stated goals of the 
Common Core, as well as the observed endpoint of the above-described epistemological trajecto-
ry), then the practice of skilled argumentive discourse may be seen as an activity within which 
the skills of good thinking are actively exercised. Encouraging good thinking, then, may lie not 
in some intervention unrelated to everyday experience, but instead in strengthening the nascent 
argumentative discourse skills evident in normal human interaction (Kuhn, 1991).  Intensive, 
sustained argumentive practice may, theoretically, counteract the immature thinker’s egocen-
trism (evident in different forms at the absolutist and multiplist stages); further, it provides an 
externalized view of internal thought processes and epistemological development – a view of 
particular importance to the educator or researcher who intends to study and support that devel-
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opment.  Argumentation as a practice in the classroom has, in recent years, seen an increase in 
terms of both application and regard for its pedagogical value. A question worthy of examining 
is whether peers are indeed capable of supporting one another in strategic and meta-level devel-
opment of the thinking skills that characterize a mature epistemology (as described above) 
through discourse, and if so by what mechanisms. 
 
Argumentation learning in the classroom 
 Numerous studies have demonstrated the potential for practice in argumentive discourse 
to promote higher-order cognition. Nussbaum and Sinatra (2003) and Asterhan and Schwartz 
(2007), for example, determined that argumentation (or, simply, instructions to argue during 
group work) facilitated conceptual change to a greater degree than did problem-solving activities 
lacking an argumentive component. Dyadic interaction enhances individual rhetorical argu-
mentive reasoning quality significantly among both adolescents and adults, relative to repeated 
prompting of control participants’ opinions (Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997). Repeated, dense 
practice in argumentation results in improvements in argument skill, depolarization over time of 
participants’ initial, strongly held opinions (Kuhn & Crowell, 2011), and movement toward a 
more advanced epistemological understanding of the goals of argumentation (Kuhn et. al, 2013).  
 Felton and Kuhn (2001) drew on Walton’s theoretical model (1995) to track adults' and 
adolescents' attention to two major goals of argumentation -- first, gaining commitments from an 
interlocutor regarding one's premises, and, second, critiquing that opponent's premises. This 
model affords straightforward evaluation of strategic skill and indirect evaluation of epistemo-
logical development (toward a dual perspective). As expected, adults in disagreeing dyads pro-
duced more counterarguments and other strategic argumentive sequences (e.g., rebuttals) than 
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did adolescents. Follow-up research performed by Felton (2004) revealed that with dense prac-
tice in one-to-one argumentive discourse, adolescent skill development proceeded “in the direc-
tion of adult discourse,” with participants displaying more frequent use in counterargument, re-
buttal, and cornering strategies relative to controls. Importantly, though, while both treatment 
groups showed improvement in counterargument use over time, only those who participated in 
five minutes of paired verbal reflection after each argument showed increased use of counterar-
gument on a transfer topic. 
 Kuhn and Udell (2003, 2007) found that 13- and 14-year olds, when engaged in both 
dense argumentive practice and group discussion about argumentation, showed more improved 
individual (rhetorical) argument skill and discourse skill relative to a comparison group who had 
participated only in group discussion -- highlighting the utility of both practice and metacogni-
tive reflection. Greater advances made in the context of practice, plus paired or group metacogni-
tive reflection, may indicate a reciprocal (or at least concomitant) relationship between actual 
skill development and refinement of metastrategic understanding. Further, meta-level activity 
could conceivably occur during individual intellectual activity (i.e., within the private cognitive 
activity occurring during one-to-one argumentation in Felton’s study), during collaborative re-
flection, or both. The intensified effects evident in conditions that require collaborative reflection 
suggest an important role for interpersonal discursive collaboration to support development at the 
meta-level.  
 
Models of effects of peer collaboration 
 Theoretical bases exist that would predict meta-level effects of peer interaction during 
argumentation, both in terms of sustained practice and in terms of collaborative reflection. Such 
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frameworks typically stem from Piagetian (1934; 1985) or Vygotskian (1978) accounts of the 
role of interpersonal interaction in cognitive development. Discussion of peer collaboration has 
historically characterized the two theoretical frameworks as incompatible: socio-constructivist 
accounts attribute effects of collaboration primarily to Piagetian decentration propelled by cogni-
tive conflict; socio-cultural accounts attribute effects to a Vygotskian interiorization of the con-
tents of cooperative discourse. Kruger (1993), Bearison and Dorval (2002), and Kuhn and col-
leagues (1997) have argued that the traditional schism between accounts of collaboration as pro-
duced by the Piagetian construct of cognitive conflict and those crediting a more Vygotskian 
process of cooperation should, on the evidence, be supplanted by a more nuanced account that 
addresses the observed variations and complexities of collaborators’ interactions (Kuhn et. al, 
1997) and that allow for explanation using both frameworks. We consider more on this shortly 
— first, a brief contrast of the two traditional frameworks. 
 While both frameworks assume that children’s ability to profit from collaborative work is 
enabled by early achievements in establishing intersubjectivity with others (Bearison & Dorval, 
2002), the socio-constructivist approach primarily locates cognitive change within the individual 
(with change accordingly measured via pre- and post-test analysis of individual behavior). Per-
haps among the best known socio-constructivist studies are those that engage collaborating chil-
dren in tasks that require coordination of perspectives during pure logic (Doise, Mugny, & Per-
ret-Clermont, 1975), spatial reasoning (Bearison et. al, 1986), or mathematical tasks (Phelps & 
Damon, 1989).  
 A Vygotskian account of development, on the other hand, privileges more directly the 
role of interpersonal interaction in the emergence of individual cognition. All achievements orig-
inate as the products of increasingly complex acts of intersubjectivity with the learner and her 
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interlocutors, from the early establishment of shared intentionality between baby and caretaker to 
the appropriation of the tools of thought valued and used by her culture.  All psychological phe-
nomena, including cognition, originates in the literal interaction between the learner and those 
with whom she shares communication, such that the content of those interactions are experi-
enced, first, on an inter-psychological plane, and second, on an intra-psychological plane where 
they have been interiorized as inner thought (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch & Stone, 1985). The 
learner’s increasing mastery of her thought processes (Gredler, 2009) can further be seen as a 
dialectic with her environment, as the learner continues to offer her appropriated tools for further 
refinement throughout development.  
 For any particular transformation to occur along the continuum, the learner must already 
possess a given set of tools for achievement of intersubjectivity with her interlocutors, and those 
interlocutors must be equipped with the ability to respond to her in a manner that expands that 
current toolset. The space between the learner’s current toolset and what she is prepared to 
achieve with her partner’s response Vygotsky (1978) dubs the learner’s “zone of proximal de-
velopment” (ZPD). These tools include both understanding of the goals of the interpersonal in-
teraction (Wertsch & Stone, 1985) and awareness of the goals of any specific competency that 
the “more capable other” intends to help her achieve. Given that the learner herself may be una-
ware of the goals of said task, the role of the “other” may be to act as the learner’s “vicarious 
consciousness” (Bruner, 1985), shouldering a degree of meta-level responsibility that the learner 
will gradually come to take on for herself (Fox & Riconscente, 2008).  
 Given their treatment of development as a dialectic, Vygotskian or socio-cultural ac-
counts of collaboration, therefore, characterize cognition — and cognitive change — as occur-
ring between individuals in communication. Measures of interest thus examine collaborative dis-
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course itself and are typically concerned with categories of discursive moves advanced by peers 
in completing a task — sometimes correlated with measures of success on the task (Damon & 
Killen, 1982; Bearison & Dorval, 2002), and sometimes assessed in terms of whether changes in 
quality of discourse can be observed over time (Goos, Galbraith, & Renshaw, 2002; Kuhn et. al, 
2013).  
 Further differentiating traditional Piagetian and Vygotskian accounts of development are 
expectations for the potential of peers of the same ability to profit from collaboration. While 
same-level peers play an integral role in effecting disequilibrium (and therefore in compelling 
cognitive restructuring) in the former account, the traditionally understood Vygotskian account 
requires that productive interaction within any zone of proximal development be led by a more 
capable other — traditionally characterized as an adult or more knowledgable peer (Wertsch & 
Stone, 1985; Rogoff, 1996). As mentioned, studies find significant benefit to collaborative work 
among same-age and even same-ability peers when tasks are constructed to produce decentration 
(Doise, Mugny, & Perret-Clermont, 1975; Schwartz, Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000; Felton & 
Kuhn, 2001; Felton, 2004; Kuhn & Crowell, 2011).  Does this mean that the benefits of peer 
(same-age, same-ability) collaboration are sufficiently explained by a traditional Piagetian per-
spective? Is there no reason to explore whether a Vygotskian perspective, which traditionally 
privileges the intersubjective dialectic between adult and child (or peers of differing ability), may 
inform our understanding of how roughly equally capable peers’ might support each others’ met-
acognitive development? 
 To the contrary — recall the earlier-mentioned work by Felton (2004) demonstrating that, 
for adolescents engaged in dense practice in one-to-one argumentation, meta-level progress was 
intensified in conditions that required verbal collaborative reflection regarding argument strate-
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gies used during each session.  Strategic skills were significantly more likely to be transferred to 
new topics within this condition, suggesting a meta-level benefit over and above that produced 
by the cognitive restructuring that may have occurred in response to repeated exposure to dise-
quilibrating perspectives. Barron (2003) found that the problem-solving performance of 6th-
grade triads varied controlling for participants’ ability levels (effects were not due to the relative 
ability of collaborators). Triads’ success depended, instead, upon the quality of their interactions 
— specifically, by partner responsiveness and by attempts to maintain joint attention to task 
goals through indications of meta-communicative awareness. Successful triads established an 
intersubjective, mutually understood problem space; these participants were thus enabled to carry 
on coherent, task-relevant conversation that allowed for the development of solutions. Barron 
speculates that those triads who performed poorly would have benefited from additional time to 
overcome problematic patterns of a “weak joint space.”  
The finding that greater intersubjectivity benefits actual achievement aligns with research 
demonstrating the superior performance of friendship pairs versus acquaintances on a variety of 
tasks (Newcomb & Brady, 1982; Azmitia and Montgomery, 1993; Miell, 2000). Interactions be-
tween collaborators with a prior friendly relationship are characterized by greater social respon-
siveness (Newcomb & Brady, 1982) and more frequent mutual commands (Newcomb, Brady, & 
Hartup, 1979; Newcomb & Brady, 1982). The evidence suggests that young collaborators sup-
port and enforce one another’s attention to task goals through mutual regulation, and that this 
process may develop over time — certainly a suggestion that aligns with the Vygotskian concep-
tion of a dialectical ZPD. It is worth asking, of course, whether greater performance within 
friendship pairs truly has to do with dialectical development of meta-level regulation or if friends 
simply work better together for other reasons (e.g., motivation, greater respect, etc.). 
   
 20 
 Research by Forman and Cazden (1985) offers suggestive evidence of the gradual devel-
opment of a ZPD between same-age collaborators negotiating their understanding of problem 
spaces, task goals and strategy effectiveness while solving complex problems in mathematics. 
While exploratory, the study illustrates through careful discourse analysis the capability of same-
age, same-ability peers to develop what Forman (1989) dubs a “bi-directional zone of proximal 
development,” enacting a process of proleptic instruction whereby each learner shares responsi-
bility for establishing and maintaining task goals and both take turns donning the role of learner 
and student interchangeably and as needed. Forman and Cazden (1985) observed that, over sev-
eral episodes, collaboration between partners progressed away from discussion of surface-level 
task division and toward cooperative interaction coordinating and monitoring one another's con-
tributions to the task. Some dyads, the authors note, required more time than others to achieve 
the intersubjectivity needed to work effectively together. Grau and Whitebread (2012) observed 
the repeated collaborative activities of two foursomes over the course of a semester and found an 
increase in self-regulated learning (SRL) activities; further, the authors found that measures of 
meta-level interactivity (average length of metacognitive conversation) explain task-level per-
formance differences between groups above and beyond the frequency of meta-level statements. 
Iiskala, Vaurus, Lehtinen, & Salonen (2011) find that students' episodes of shared metacognition 
became more extended as mathematical problems became more difficult. These studies, while all 
exploratory, suggest that equally capable peers may form zones of proximal development that are 
explicitly characterized by changes in socially mediated metacognitive discussion. In these stud-
ies, where individuals contribute, benefit from, and transform one another’s understanding of 
task goals and strategies through feedback, it is arguably at the meta-strategic level that learners 
appear to lend one another support. 
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 Kuhn’s research on adolescent argumentation skills (2008; 2011; 2013) offers an oppor-
tunity to explore more specifically how peers support each other in attaining mastery of the 
thinking skills that concern us here (i.e., contemplating and evaluating one’s own theories, re-
flecting on alternatives, and considering the relative merits of evidence that bears upon them). 
Rather than attributing or measuring change at either the individual (pre- and post-test) or inter-
personal level, Kuhn’s research program demonstrates that peer collaboration may exert its bene-
fits both via individual cognitive restructuring and via an intersubjective process whereby the 
contents of discourse are interiorized at a meta-level.  
 Kuhn, Goh, Iordanou, and Shaenfield (2008) built upon the work conducted by Felton 
and Kuhn (2001) and Felton (2004). Drawing on Walton's model of argumentation, the authors 
showed that intensive practice in argumentation between dyads in a computer-based format led 
to increased strategic use of counterargument. A second and more extended study (Kuhn & 
Crowell, 2011) engaged a new cohort of students in three years of twice-weekly argument prac-
tice (dyad against dyad). Results showed not only markedly superior strategic skill in dialogic 
argumentation, but also in expository writing, compared to a group undergoing instruction in a 
more traditional philosophy curriculum (Reznitskaya, 2012). Kuhn and Crowell’s students pro-
duced argumentive essays significantly more likely to address alternatives (i.e., they addressed 
not only their own stance toward a topic but anticipated and addressed the imagined objections 
of an opposing audience). Further, Kuhn and Crowell’s students displayed decreased certainty in 
their personal positions when polled post-intervention. Control participants, on the other hand, 
tended to become more polarized in their positions by final assessment. And importantly, follow-
up study involving another cohort partaking in the same curriculum were more likely to use evi-
dence to support their claims in post-test essay-based and dialogic assessments (Kuhn & Moore, 
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2015).  In addition to demonstrating clear progress in strategic skill, all of these results suggest 
that over time, practice in argumentation led to students’ increased distancing from their own 
perspectives in response to disequilibrating experiences. Taking a Piagetian constructivist stance, 
Kuhn contends that during exposure to sustained practice in dialogic argumentation, the learner 
repeatedly confronts opposition to her existing theories and must accommodate by adjusting her 
theoretical view. Through frequent exposure to opposing perspectives or to evidence that contra-
dicts her own perspectives, the learner must note the contrast. Discourse thereby compels the 
learner to practice holding her own theories as objects of reflection, thus catalyzing the work of 
the nascent meta-level executive whose task it is to learn to separate and, eventually, coordinate 
theory and evidence. 
 In addition, however, to strengthening metacognitive competence, learning to argue pro-
ductively requires that students develop the skills to consistently sustain argumentive discourse. 
While some of this meta-level work is presumably conducted by the individual, further examina-
tion of data emanating from Kuhn’s research program suggests that students may have a crucial 
role in supporting one another’s metastrategic skill (e.g., knowing when to counter a claim; 
knowing how to apply evidence in support of a claim). It is, therefore via analysis of the meta-
talk (i.e., explicit reference to the quality or process of argumentation) within dialogs, and within 
recorded intra-dyad discussion, that we see the potential for a developing meta-level ZPD to un-
fold among participants.  
 To examine this possibility we can examine transcripts of the electronic dialogs them-
selves — seeking to identify the potential role of meta-level discourse to benefit students’ devel-
oping strategic skill. Close examination of such data collected by Kuhn and colleagues revealed 
significantly greater direct counterargument usage for those pairs who produced relatively higher 
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percentages of "meta-talk" within the typed inter-dyad dialogs. Given this result, the authors of 
the 2008 study note, social collaboration that included more meta-talk may have positively im-
pacted high-performing pairs' strategic skill.  They also note, however, that because intra-dyad 
discussions were not recorded, it was not possible to determine the degree to which individuals' 
meta-level awareness, or intra-dyad conversation, might have led to increased strategic skill. 
 Research by Shaenfield (2009) more closely examined this potentially facilitative role of 
meta-level discourse. Replicating the Kuhn et al (2008) study, Shaenfield went a step further, 
recording students' dyadic discussions as they argued with their opponents electronically. As 
predicted, strategic skills improved.  Examining within-dyad discussion revealed that those par-
ticipants who produced more meta-level statements also demonstrated a significantly greater in-
crease in strategic skill relative to others. Further, the author discovered no relationship between 
total amount of talk between partners and strategic skill, highlighting the privileged status of 
metacognitive discussion, specifically, in mediating progress.  
Further research conducted by Kuhn, Zillmer, Crowell, and Zavala (2013) provides addi-
tional evidence that practice and refinement of goals may act interdependently to produce gains 
in both strategic and metastrategic skill. Using data collected in the 2011 intervention (wherein 
students engaged in twice-weekly argument practice over the course of three years), these au-
thors investigated the quantity and quality of inter-dyad, meta-level dialog over the first two 
years of practice. Over those two years, meta-talk revealed changes in students' understanding of 
the norms governing effective argumentation, with the importance of direct counterargument and 
the role of evidence featuring frequently in discussion. Talk became increasingly focused on di-
recting the argument process according to those norms, and meta-level conversations became 
increasingly reciprocal. Importantly, these changes occurred gradually; moreover, sophisticated 
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discussions of norms began to appear in the conversations and to propagate among dyads during 
Year 1, well before strategic class-wide gains became statistically significant at the end of Year 
2, and these were not limited to a few capable students.  
This pattern suggests a potential functional role for meta-level discussion in the develop-
ment of metastrategic skill — one that may be characterized within a Vygotskian framework 
privileging the function of a socially-mediated zone of proximal development. The revision of 
discourse goals that we see as a class-wide phenomenon (Kuhn et al., 2013) seems to entail the 
propagation of specific ideas about argumentation itself. The goals that are made explicit within 
the dialogs are enforced (or students attempt to enforce them) when adherence fails, and oppo-
nents begin to respond to those regulatory statements, sometimes with meta-level statements of 
their own. Thus, the nature of metacognitive conversation itself changes, becoming increasingly 
regulatory, reciprocal, and extended over time.  
 If inter-dyad discussion within the electronic dialogs seems to indicate the existence of a 
class-wide zone of proximal development, it is plausible that interaction of individuals within the 
dyads operates similarly. In this case, dyads form a bi-directional ZPD, with partners adopting 
the role of teacher/learner interchangeably and as needed. Adopting a Vygotskian perspective, 
we would assume that the collaboration, which consists of two equals negotiating their under-
standing of argument's goals, scaffolds each individual's understanding by providing a metacog-
nitive space greater than either has available alone. Within the "external" metacognitive space 
between the two partners, an opportunity exists for discussion of argument's goals. The possibil-
ity then exists for each partner to interiorize that external metacognitive space (the regulatory 
activity occurring between self and partner), and as support is maintained, metastrategic under-
standing is continually expressed and refined. Given that individual development would occur 
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over time, we would expect the nature of that metacognitive space -- including the characteristics 
of its expression between the collaborating individuals -- to change form over time. 
 It is between collaborators that we might expect to see a critical role for developing inter-
subjectivity to support metastrategic skill, meaning that the longer a partnership remains togeth-
er, the greater the possibility for such a ZPD to develop. The present study examines differences 
in two types of collaboration between dyads jointly constructing arguments against opposing-
side dyads: We compare the collaboration that occurs between dyads who have worked together 
over the course of six argument sessions (Stay condition) to the collaboration that occurs be-
tween dyads whose members have previously worked with different partners during each of the 
previous six sessions (Switch condition). In doing so, we wish to test the hypotheses that the ac-
tivity between dyad-members suggests the existence of a bi-directional zone of proximal devel-
opment that facilitates the development of metastrategic understanding as well as performance 
itself.  
 To conduct the present study, we replicated the intervention conducted by Kuhn and 
Crowell (2011). Participants (all 6th graders at the outset) took part in twice-weekly argument 
sessions, arguing dyad against dyad, with discussions conducted via online chat technology. 
Over two years, students discussed a sequence of topics of social importance (one per academic 
quarter). In the previous study, for each topic, students worked with a single partner over the 
course of six argument sessions. However, during Year 2 of the current study, we revised the 
conditions students experienced during topics 2 and 3. During topic 2, half of the students 
worked with a single partner over six argument sessions (Stay condition), and half worked with a 
different partner for each of those six sessions (Switch condition). We created the same condi-
tions for topic 3. The study examines the intra-dyad discussion audio recorded during topics 2 
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and 3, making it possible to identify whether differences exist between the Stay and Switch con-
ditions. Specifically, discussions are examined with regard to frequency of regulatory metacogni-
tive talk and the transactional quality of metacognitive discussion.  
 
Hypotheses of the present study 
  Adopting the assumption that dyads function as bi-directional zones of proximal devel-
opment, we hypothesize that collaborative discussions between participants in the Stay condition 
will be qualitatively different from those between participants in the Switch condition. If dyadic 
interaction propels metastrategic understanding by instigating a fluid, bi-directional process be-
tween interlocutors, then extended time with a constant partner should lead to differences in me-
ta-level discussion between Stay partners and Switch partners. Specifically, we expect discussion 
between longer-term (Stay) partners to contain more meta-talk and this meta-talk to be more reg-
ulatory (directive) in nature. Given that students in the Switch condition need to re-establish in-
tersubjectivity anew at each session, we expect the final session between Switch students to fea-
ture fewer instances of meta-talk generally and regulatory meta-talk specifically. We also expect 
that partners in the Stay condition as a result may be more productive within the actual argument 
task, as defined by greater use of the critical counterargument strategy.  
 
Specifically, the proposed hypotheses are: 
 
H1. Collaborative discussion between dyad-members in the Stay condition may exhibit more 
frequent metacognitive utterances than discussion between dyad-members in the Switch condi-
tion. 
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H2. Collaborative discussion in the Stay condition may exhibit more frequent regulatory meta-
cognitive talk that seeks to guide or direct the activity according to task goals, compared to col-
laborative discussion in the Switch condition. 
 
H3. Meta-level discussions may be more reciprocal (longer) in the Stay than Switch condition, 
indicated by meta-level utterances in the Stay condition more likely to be followed by another 
meta-level utterance. 
 
H4. Given indications from prior research that meta-level understanding and strategic skill de-
velop interdependently, electronic discourse with opposing-side pairs in the Stay condition may 
contain greater proportions of counterargument, compared to the Switch condition.  
 
H5. Electronic discourse with opposing-side pairs in the Stay condition may contain greater pro-
portions of metacognitive talk compared to electronic discourse in the Switch condition, reflect-
ing the (hypothesized) greater verbal focus on meta-level concerns between dyad-members in the 
Stay condition.  
 
  





 Participants were 64 middle school students (34 females) attending a moderately selec-
tive, public college-preparatory school in a large city in the Northeast United States.  They par-
ticipated during their 6th and 7th grade years. Approximately 80% of students at the school were 
either Hispanic or African American, and 60% qualified for reduced-price or free lunch. Ac-
ceptance to the school was based upon both achievement scores and an in-person interview; thus, 
the students in this study were somewhat more academically accomplished than a random sam-
ple of the general population. The exact criteria upon which students were judged are not public-
ly available; however, the school professed to serve talented students showing an interest in 
math, science, and engineering.  
Students at the school had been randomly assigned to one of three classrooms at the start 
of 6th grade. Hence the three classes could be regarded as equivalent. Two of these classrooms 
(referred to here as Class A and Class B) were randomly chosen to participate in the argument 
curriculum while the third (Class C) participated in a philosophy curriculum designed by school 
staff. The present study focuses only on the 64 students in Class A and Class B who participated 
in the argument curriculum that is the basis for the research reported here. 
  
Procedure 
 All students in the present study participated in an argument curriculum that was imple-
mented during twice weekly 50-minute class sessions over a period of two years.  
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The curriculum was implemented as a stand-alone course delivered by the researchers. Students 
were introduced to four consecutive topics of social importance (e.g., "Should kidney sales be 
legal?") each year, with approximately eight weeks of work on each topic, culminating in a 
whole-class debate.  
 
 Initial polling. At the start of each topic cycle, students were asked to claim either a “pro” 
or “con” position with regard to the topic and were asked to indicate their degree of certainty 
about their position. They were then divided into two opposing teams. In case of an uneven split 
between “pro” and “con” responses, students demonstrating less certainty were assigned to the 
side with fewer participants. Topics used in the curriculum were chosen from a pool that proved 
during pilot studies to produce a fairly even split; thus, having to assign students to the non-
preferred side was rare. A list of topics used throughout the two-year curriculum is provided in 
Appendix A. 
 Small group preparation.  Once the two opposing teams were formed, students were fur-
ther divided into smaller groups of eight students each. Over the course of two class sessions, 
these small groups generated, discussed, and refined reasons for their position.  
 Day One: At the start of the first of these two sessions, the focus was simply on allowing 
students to generate reasons for their position. An adult coach informed the students, “Our first 
task is to be sure we have the best reasons for our position. People can have different reasons for 
being for or against something. We need to get these reasons out on the table and decide what we 
think of them.” Each student received an index card and was instructed to write down one strong 
reason for holding their position. The student then passed this reason card to a neighbor to the 
left. Having received a reason card from a neighbor to the right, each student then helped that 
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classmate to reword his or her reason in as few words as possible. Students then presented the 
“fewest words” version of their reason cards to their respective eight-person groups.  During the 
remaining time, groups were asked to eliminate any duplicates among reason cards and to group 
similar reasons together.  Finally, students received a take-home opinion poll assignment; stu-
dents were to ask three people their positions and reasons for their positions on the topic, then 
bring the responses back for the next class. 
 Day Two: During the second small group session, eight-person groups reconvened. 
Groups were asked to review the opinion polls they had conducted as an outside assignment and 
to consider whether there were any new reasons that they could add to their set. The coach in-
structed, “If you want to add a reason, put it on a card. Be sure it’s not a reason you already have 
and write it in the clearest, shortest possible way. If everyone agrees, add the card to the set on 
the table.”  
 The remainder of this second small group session focused on either comparing the rela-
tive strength of reasons already generated (year 1 curriculum), or on examining what evidence 
might strengthen generated reasons (year 2 curriculum).  Sixth graders (year 1 curriculum) en-
gaged in a coach-facilitated discussion of what criteria might make some reasons “better” than 
others (e.g., stronger reasons might be more persuasive or might be supported by evidence), then 
discussed in small groups which of their generated reasons were strongest, separating all reason 
cards into “okay,” “better,” and “best” categories.  
 By the second year, this comparison of reasons was eliminated; instead, students worked 
on identifying evidence to support their generated reasons. The coach handed each small group a 
set of “evidence questions,” explaining: “This year we’re going to work on using evidence to 
strengthen our arguments.  We’ve found answers to some of the factual questions that you might 
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want answers to. A set of envelopes with a question on each (and answer inside) about our topic 
is here for your use.” Small group members divided reason cards amongst themselves. Students 
were instructed to look at their reason card and consider whether the answers to any of the avail-
able set of evidence questions could help to support that reason. If so, the student could obtain 
the associated answer, write a one-sentence summary of the evidence on a yellow post-it note, 
and then attach that note to the reason card. When finished, students were instructed to present 
that reason card to their small group, explaining how the attached evidence supported that rea-
son. Students were encouraged to generate questions of their own to add to the set of evidence 
questions and answers; brief answers were provided at the next session and these became part of 
the evidence question-and-answer set available to the group. 
 Dialogs with opposing-team pairs.  Next, students were divided into same-side pairs 
within their respective teams. Over the following six class sessions, pairs engaged, dyad to dyad, 
in a series of electronic dialogs using online chat software. Each same-side dyad met with a new 
opposing dyad at each of the six sessions.  
 During these sessions, same-side partners sat next to one another and shared a laptop 
computer. (Thus, with 32 students in the classroom, 16 laptop computers were in use during a 
class period.)  Students could take turns typing their arguments but were instructed to collaborate 
and agree on what was to be said before typing and sending a response. The electronic format 
also permitted students to view and reflect on their own and their opponents’ statements after 
they had been made.  
 Students first logged into a Google iChat using credentials provided to them. Next, stu-
dents were instructed as to which side (pro or con) would begin the dialog (this alternated by ses-
sion). Those starting the dialog were to begin as follows: “We believe that [kidney sales should 
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be legal] because ….”  Students were further instructed to take turns, to allow their opponents to 
respond, and to limit each turn to a maximum of two separate points supporting their position.  
Accounting for set-up, login, logout, and technology clean-up, dialogs lasted approximately 25 
minutes. 
Although encouraged and reminded to collaborate with one another in constructing their 
responses to the opposing pair, students were instructed not to communicate verbally with any 
other students in the room.  Students were presented with examples of acceptable collaboration 
(e.g., “It does not mean dividing up the work, like ‘you think what to say and I’ll type’. It does 
mean talking to one another and working out any disagreements you have before you type.”). 
Students were also instructed to respond directly to their opponents, to try to “counter,” or weak-
en, their claims (i.e., “Don’t just ignore it because you think your point is better.”). This guidance 
constituted the only explicit statement the coach made regarding the importance of counterargu-
ment. 
To encourage students’ metacognitive reflection on their argumentation, pairs were given 
“reflection sheets” to complete while waiting for opponents to respond.  Reflection sheets were 
of two forms. One, an “Own Side” reflection sheet, asked pairs to record their single best argu-
ment from the dialog, their opponent’s response to that argument (ideally, a counter), and the 
pair’s response (ideally, a rebuttal). Finally, pairs were to imagine and record an improved re-
sponse to their opponent. An “Other Side” reflection sheet asked pairs to record their opponent’s 
main argument and their own response (again, ideally a counter), and finally to construct an im-
proved response.  These sheets are shown in Appendices B and C. 
During the second year, while working on their reflection sheets students had access to 
the set of evidence questions and answers that had been generated during their small group work. 
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Students were also encouraged to support with evidence any own-side or other-side arguments 
that appeared on their reflection sheets; they could do this by summarizing it on a post-it note, 
and affixing the note next to the associated argument on the reflection sheet. Reflection sheets 
were collected by coaches at the end of each argument session for later small group work.  
 
Small group preparation for class-wide debate. Following the six dialog sessions and in 
preparation for a final class-wide debate (referred to as the “Showdown”), students next recon-
vened in their same-side eight-person groups. Two class sessions were devoted to this prepara-
tion. 
Day 1: Day 1 focused on reviewing opponents’ arguments and refining possible counters 
to those arguments. Each pro-side eight-person group received for their review all Other-Side 
reflection sheets that pro-side pairs had completed during dialog sessions. Each con-side eight-
person group received all Other-Side sheets that con-side pairs had completed. The coach intro-
duced the day’s activity by stating: “We’ll want to know all the others’ arguments and have our 
best counterarguments to them at our fingertips during the Showdown.  Getting them ready is our 
task for today.”  
Students were instructed to group all reflection sheets into piles, one for each “other side” 
main argument. Students were then assigned to work in pairs, with each pair taking a share of 
these piles. For each pile, pairs were instructed to complete a superseding top-sheet, containing 
the other-side main argument under consideration. Pairs were to identify and write on this top-
sheet the very best counterargument that had been produced by their same-side team in response 
to this other-side argument. When finished, pairs passed their work to another pair for review. 
The coach asked, “Have your teammates written on the top-sheet the best, strongest counter, the 
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one that will do the most damage to weaken this reason?  Is there a better counter or a better way 
to say this one? If so, attach a blue post-it with your suggestion.” These “Other Side” final reflec-
tion sheets were then collected and saved for use during the final showdown debate. 
 Day 2: Each pro-side eight-person group received for their review all Own-Side reflec-
tion sheets that pro-side pairs had completed during the dialogs. Each con-side eight-person 
group received all Own-Side sheets that con-side pairs had completed. The coach introduced the 
day’s activity, stating: “We’ll need to have one of these sheets for each of our reasons at our fin-
gertips during the Showdown, so we know what to come back with when they try to attack our 
reasons.  Getting them ready is our task for today.” 
Students were instructed to group all sheets into piles, one for each “own-side” main ar-
gument that had been identified. Students were then assigned to work in pairs, with each pair tak-
ing a share of these piles. For each pile, pairs were instructed to review all counters that oppo-
nents had used in response to the own-side argument under consideration. Pairs were then to 
identify the two or three most damaging counterarguments leveled by the other side, and for each 
of these to create a new master sheet to have available during the upcoming showdown. On this 
sheet they were instructed to identify and record the most successful rebuttal  (“comeback”) that 
their own side had in response to each of the opponents’ counterarguments.  
When finished, pairs passed their work to another pair for review. The coach asked, 
“Have your teammates written on the top-sheet the best, strongest comeback to each counter, the 
one that will best save our reason?  Is there a better comeback or a better way to say this one? If 
so, attach a blue post-it with your suggestion.” These “Own Side” final reflection sheets were 
then collected for use during the final showdown debate. 
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Class-wide showdown debate. During the penultimate session of the sequence for each 
topic, students engaged in a whole-class debate between the two sides. Pro and con sides sat on 
opposite sides of the classroom, and sides were again divided into their eight-person groups, with 
each eight-person group sitting at its own table. To start, one student from each side (pro and 
con) volunteered to sit at the front of the room in one of two “hot seats.” If a member of the pro 
side sat in the “hot seat,” their eight-person small group was considered to be sitting at the “hot 
table.” Occupiers of the hot seat engaged for two minutes in verbal debate, with a coin toss de-
termining who should begin. Each “hot table” group (including the speaker in the hot seat) was 
allowed to call a single one-minute “huddle” per speaker to confer with one another. The eight-
person groups at the hot table had available for reference all of their finalized “Own Side” and 
“Other Side” reflection sheets. When time was up, a new student from each side took the hot-seat 
positions. 
Since time was stopped during these huddles, a hot-seat round lasted anywhere from two 
minutes to four minutes per pair of students. Typically, four to six rounds were completed in the 
class period, with the eight-person group occupying the hot table switching half way through the 
class. While a group was not occupying the hot table, they were allowed to pass notes to their 
hot-table teammates but otherwise did not participate and only observed. 
In the final class session, the coach engaged the whole class in a review of the debate. 
Points were awarded for successful counterarguments and use of evidence and subtracted for un-
connected responses, unwarranted assumptions, or mischaracterization of evidence.  A winning 
team was declared. Students were then assigned to write an individual essay (in the form of a 
newspaper letter to the editor) that was due at the next class session, when a new topic cycle be-
gan. 
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Condition manipulation 
Participants in the present study were 7th graders participating in the second year of the 
argument curriculum and thus had already experienced the full topic cycle five times. The pre-
sent study focuses on the sixth and seventh topic cycles (topics 2 and 3 of the second year).  Dur-
ing these cycles a manipulation was introduced with respect to the assignment of same-side pairs 
during the six online dialog sessions. 
For all other topic cycles, students were paired with the same partner for the six online 
sessions for a topic cycle. For the present study, however, during Topic 2, students in one class-
room (Class A) worked with the same partner during the six dialog sessions, as customary (Stay 
condition). In contrast, students in the other classroom (Class B) worked with a different partner 
at each of those six sessions (Switch condition). During the next topic, Topic 3, these conditions 
were switched: Class A experienced the Switch condition while Class B experienced the Stay 
condition. (See Table 1.) The purpose of the manipulation was to examine whether the Stay and 
Switch conditions led to differences in the quality of discussion between the same-side pair 
members and/or differences in the quality of electronic discourse of the pair with the opposing 
pairs they engaged.  For the purpose of assessing effects of the contrasting conditions, all same-
side pairs’ verbal communication with one another was audio taped during the sixth (final) dia-
log session for Topic 2 and for Topic 3.  For Topic 2, partners were new to each other in Class A 
(Switch condition) while in Class B (Stay condition), the two had been working as a pair for the 
preceding five dialogs on the topic.  For Topic 3, the conditions were reversed with Class A in 
the Stay condition and Class B in the Switch condition. All participants thus served in both con-
ditions, permitting a within-subject comparison.  
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Table 1. Assignment of Classrooms to Stay and Switch Conditions during Topics 2 and 3 
 STAY CONDITION SWITCH CONDITION 
Topic 2  Class A Class B 
   
Topic 3  Class B Class A 
 
 
Assignment of pairs 
 At the beginning of a typical topic cycle in the argument curriculum, each student is ran-
domly assigned to another of the same gender with whom he or she remains throughout the six 
online sessions. During the Stay condition of this study, the usual protocol was followed. There-
fore, nearly all Stay pairs participating in session 6 consisted of two students of the same gender; 
in total, there were 13 male-male, 17 female-female, and two male-female pairs. 
 In the Switch condition, students were randomly assigned to a partner for each online 
session, the sole requirement being that no students had worked together during a prior one. 
Gender was thus not considered during the pairing process in the Switch condition. Switch pairs 
participating in session 6 therefore included five male-male, eight female-female, and 19 male-
female partnerships.  
 Given that nearly all data from the Stay topic emanates from same-gender pairs, while the 
majority of data from the Switch topic emanates from mixed-gender pairs, it is important to con-
sider that a potential confound may have been introduced into the study. If students in the Stay 
condition perform significantly differently from students in the Switch condition, it may be by 
virtue of their participating with another student of the same gender (as opposed to another stu-
dent of the opposite gender), rather than by virtue of more time spent with a partner. While this 
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would not necessarily invalidate the rationale behind this study’s hypotheses (i.e., that greater 
familiarity sets the stage for greater meta-level support), it would be impossible to know whether 
greater familiarity resulted from (for example) greater comfort with a same-gender partner or 
from lengthier interaction time.  Analyses were therefore conducted to determine whether, in the 
Switch condition, any significant differences existed between same-gender versus mixed-gender 






















Coding of intra-dyad verbal discourse 
 As an outcome measure to compare the quality of intra-dyad discourse in the Stay and 
Switch conditions, meta-level talk between the same-side pair at the final dialog session was as-
sessed. The present study follows prior studies in distinguishing between utterances about the 
topic under discussion (topic utterances) and meta-level utterances about the discourse itself 
(Kuhn, et. al, 2008; Kuhn, Goh, Iordanou & Shaenfield, 2008). For example, the statement “Kid-
ney sales should be legal because there aren’t enough donors” refers to the topic under discus-
sion, while the response “You need to back that up with evidence” refers to what is happening in 
the discussion. Meta-level utterances may be employed as commentary on the discourse.  They 
may also be employed with an objective to direct the discourse. 
 For the purpose of devising a coding scheme for all intra-dyad talk, five full-length au-
dio-tapes (14% of all data) were randomly chosen and transcribed in full by the author. Conver-
sational turn (i.e., beginning each time one participant spoke and finishing when that participant 
stopped speaking) was taken as the unit of analysis. Conversational turns were observed to fall 
into five major categories: a) off-task talk, b) talk about the topic, c) non-substantive task talk, d) 
status update talk, and e) meta-level talk.  Examples appear in Table 2. 
Each conversational turn (henceforth referred to as utterance) was examined and identi-
fied either as meta-level talk or non-meta-level talk (i.e., off-task, topic, status update, and non-
substantive task talk). The author and another coder blind to condition identified all meta-level 
utterances, with inter-rater agreement of 90%. The author therefore reviewed the remaining au-
diotapes, identifying and transcribing only meta-level utterances for analysis.  
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Table 2. General coding scheme for intra-dyad discussion 
Off-task talk I’m hungry. 
 Do we have homework? 
 What are you getting for a grade in here? 
 What did you ask for for Christmas? 
 Rainy days are the best kind of days. 
Topic talk Obama created so many jobs. 
 China could survive without the one child policy. 
 Why should the law stay the same? 
 She’s going to the hospital once, but she’s giving birth twice - it’s a 
one birth policy. 
 China has a dictator so that means they have to follow what they 
said. 
 There’s a lot of Chinese kids under adoption, so pretty much if you 
do have more than one kid it’s just spreading it out over the world. 
Somebody’s gonna get that child. 
 What’s that organization that helps people? The Red Cross, right? 
 Women can take fertility drugs to have multiple births. 
Non-substantive task 
talk 
Where are the worksheets? 
 It’s my turn to type. 
 The computer’s not letting me log in. 
 Should I type and you do the sheet? 
 You’re spelling that wrong. 
 Come do the reflection sheet. Just write what they said. 
 Wait, I need to finish writing. 
Status update talk My partner and I have been waiting for our opponents for five 
minutes. 
 Our opponents are typing now. 
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 First they said …., and then we said …., and then they said …. 
(participant gives no further evaluation or interpretation) 
 So they just replied. 
Meta-level talk Not a strong argument. 
 I don’t think we have any evidence for that. 
 What could we possibly say to that? 
 We have proof that they really did say that. 
 They’re not making any sense! 
 You aren’t looking at it in both ways. 
 It's good but we also have to find an evidence to prove our saying. 




 The rationale for analyzing frequency, rather than proportion, of overall meta-talk was 
twofold: first, length of conversation time was controlled; second, the meta-level activity of pairs 
who were generally more verbal might be masked in comparison with generally quieter pairs. In 
anticipation of likely interest in proportion of overall meta-talk, however, a subset of conversa-
tions was transcribed in addition to those utilized for achieving inter-rater agreement. While in-
ter-rater agreement was not established with regard to off-task versus on-task talk (the latter en-
compassing topic talk, non-substantive task talk, status update talk, and meta-talk), an unofficial 
accounting based on this subset of the conversations (10 Stay pairs and eight Switch pairs) 
showed that pairs averaged 63 total utterances and 42 on-task utterances. Of on-task talk, 27% 
qualified as meta-talk. 
  
 The author further divided meta-level talk into subtypes (see Table 3). Meta-level utter-
ances appeared to fulfill at least one of the following possible functions: The speaker may evalu-
   
 42 
ate the merits of an argument or the effectiveness of some aspect of the argument process, be it 
the partner’s, the dyad’s, or the opponent’s activity or strategy; she might interpret the argument 
or evidence in front of her; the speaker may solicit help from her partner to understand or pro-
ceed; she may attempt to direct the course of argument construction by engaging her partner in 
planning to meet anticipated task requirements or by directly regulating her own, the  partner’s, 
or the dyad’s activity. Very rarely, the speaker may make a statement predicting what the oppo-
nent might say or do next.  
 
Table 3. Coding scheme for intra-dyad meta-level discussion 
Function % of all meta-
level utter-





Evaluating  21.00% This argument is no good. 
  I feel that this entire thing has been totally unproduc-
tive. 
  That doesn’t make any sense. 
  They seem to be very muddled by what we said be-
cause it was so intelligent! 
  Good thinking. 
  They're just repeating themselves. 
Interpreting 17.50% That's not a counter. 
  I think they gave an argument for us. This is for our 
side, I think. 
  Yeah, not exactly true because what they’re saying is 
an unwarranted assumption. 
  That's what you were inferring. 
Solicit Help 21.00% What’s their point? 
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  What does it mean? 
  Look at this one and tell me if it’s okay, please. 
Planning 21.00% Do we have evidence? How about for theirs? 
  What evidence would you get for … 
  How does this help us? 
  Can we catch them for an unwarranted assumption for 
saying they don’t know? 
Regulating 42.00% We have to wait for them first. So let’s talk about what 
argument we want to use… 
  Look for evidence of China’s overpopulation. 
  You’re supposed to write a counter, too. 
  At the end, write, “by the way, that’s not a counter.” 
  They tried changing the subject? Say, “don’t change 
the subject.” 
Predicting 1.70% I expect them to counter easy. 
  They’re probably gonna say that … 
 
 
 Note that meta-level statements may fulfill more than one of the described functions at a 
time. For example, when a student asks her partner, “How does that help us?” (referring to a 
piece of evidence), she can arguably be said to be attempting to interpret the piece of evidence 
(interpret) and to engage her partner in planning to use that evidence (planning). She may also 
be soliciting her partner’s help (solicit help).   
According to the hypotheses advanced earlier and motivating this study, meta-level con-
versation may change form over time as dyad members develop a working relationship. In par-
ticular, it is proposed that students in the Stay condition may be more likely than students in the 
Switch condition to attempt to guide the course of the collaborative work by engaging their part-
ners in planning and/or through explicitly regulatory directives. Students in the Stay condition 
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are expected, therefore, to show a higher proportion of regulating and/or planning utterances rel-
ative to all meta-level utterances.   What is of interest to analyze for present purposes, then, for 
any utterance being examined, is whether any of its observed functions include planning, regulat-
ing, or both (with both exemplified in the following statement: “I think we should start it off dif-
ferently this time, because we always use the same reason”). Therefore, all utterances were ana-
lyzed in terms of whether they qualified for the planning code and also as to whether they quali-
fied for the regulating code. The author and one other coder analyzed 10% of all conversations 
and reached 86% agreement in discerning which utterances qualified for the planning code and 
84% agreement in discerning which utterances qualified for the regulating code.  
While the transcripts were not analyzed statistically for changes in the remaining codes, 
the percentage of meta-level utterances that qualified for each of these codes is included for de-
scriptive purposes in Table 2. Inter-rater agreement was achieved for predicting (with agreement 
of 97%), soliciting help (agreement of 95%), and evaluating or interpreting (agreement of 85%). 
There was some difficulty in achieving agreement with regard to distinguishing between evaluat-
ing and interpreting; because the difference between them is arguably subtle, and no statistical 
comparison of the two was planned, these two codes were collapsed during assessment of inter-
rater agreement. 
 
 Analysis of intra-dyad verbal discourse 
 It is not possible to compare all pairs’ conversations in the Stay condition with all pairs’ 
conversations in the Switch condition, because the same students were involved in both condi-
tions but in different pairings — thus, assumptions of independence necessary for statistical 
comparison cannot be met. Two types of analyses were therefore conducted. First, repeated 
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measures analyses were conducted at the individual level. Since all intra-dyad discussions were 
audio-recorded, individual students’ contributions to each conversation can be discerned. Intra-
dyad data are available in both Stay and Switch conditions for 22 students (not all pairs were 
recorded due to equipment shortage and a few audiotapes were missing). For those 22 students, a 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for each measure of interest 
comparing the student’s performance in the Stay condition with the same student’s performance 
in the Switch condition. To account for possible order effects (of which condition the student ex-
perienced first), classroom was used as a between-subjects factor in these analyses (since the 
Switch condition occurred first in one class and second in the other).  
 A second set of analyses was conducted to confirm the findings of the repeated measures 
analysis. In these analyses, a comparison was first made during Topic 2 between the Stay condi-
tion in Class A and the Switch condition in Class B; next, a comparison was made during Topic 
3 between the Switch condition in Class A and the Stay condition in Class B. (See Table 4.) This 
strategy (while lacking the statistical power of a full analysis of all “Stay” conversations versus 
all “Switch” conversations) allows for a parametric statistical comparison of conditions since no 
student appears twice in the same comparison. 
 
Table 4. Stay versus Switch classrooms compared during Topics 2 and 3. 
 STAY CONDITION  SWITCH CONDITION 
Topic 2  Class A vs. Class B 
    
Topic 3  Class B vs. Class A 
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 Descriptive analysis of proportions of meta-talk. Based on the earlier-mentioned subset 
of fully transcribed conversations (10 Stay pairs and eight Switch pairs, with no student appear-
ing in both conditions), Stay pairs generated, on average, approximately 42 on-task utterances of 
which 30% qualified as meta-talk. Switch pairs generated 41 on-task utterances on average, of 
which 23% qualified as meta-talk. (See Table 5.) We next describe the planned parametric com-
parisons of conditions based on all available data; this includes the repeated measures analysis of 
individuals’ meta-talk frequency, followed by comparisons of meta-talk frequency between Stay 
and Switch pairs during Topics 2 and 3. 
 
Table 5. Proportions of meta-talk in subset of intra-dyad conversations 
 Mean total utterances On-task utterances % Meta of on-task talk 
Stay 69.60 42.40 29.81% 
    
Switch 54.25 40.86 22.80% 
    
Stay & Switch 
 
62.8 41.7 26.69% 
 
 
 Analysis of individual students’ meta-level utterances. A repeated measures analysis of 
variance was planned for frequency of meta-level utterances per conversation, for proportion of 
planning utterances relative to all meta-level statements, and for proportion of regulating utter-
ances relative to all meta-level statements. Exploratory analyses revealed the distribution to be 
non-normal for most of these outcome measures; neither square root transformation (for frequen-
cies) nor arcsin transformation (for proportions) succeeded in normalizing the data. Therefore, a 
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non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank analysis was also performed for each outcome measure. 
Results of both the parametric and non-parametric tests are reported here. 
 Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant difference in 
frequency of overall meta-level utterances between Stay (M = 5.59) and Switch (M = 2.55) con-
ditions, F(1,20) = 10.27, p = .004, Cohen’s d = 1.11, with students producing more of these ut-
terances in the Stay condition (See Table 6). A Wilcoxon signed-rank analysis also revealed a 
significant difference in frequency of meta-level talk between Stay and Switch conditions, p = 
.001. No interaction was found between condition (i.e., Stay versus Switch) and classroom (Class 
A versus Class B), F(1,20) = 1.112, p = .304, and using classroom as a between-subjects variable 
revealed no significant difference between groups, F(1,20) = 0.00, p = .993. 
 Repeated measures ANOVA also revealed a significant difference between Stay (M 
=19.08%) and Switch (M = 4.24%) conditions in proportion of planning statements relative to 
all meta-level utterances, F(1,15) = 6.743, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .96, with students in the Stay 
condition producing a higher proportion of planning statements than students in the Switch con-
dition (see Table 7).  A Wilcoxon signed-rank test likewise revealed a significant difference be-
tween Stay and Switch conditions in proportion of planning statements, p = .021. No interaction 
was found between condition and classroom, F(1,15) = 3.16, p = .096, and using classroom as a 
between-subjects variable revealed no significant differences between groups, F(1,15) = 1.435, p 
= .249. Note that this proportion analysis can be conducted only for those students who made at 
least one meta-level utterance during both Stay and Switch conditions; thus, the analysis is based 
on 17 rather than 22 students. 
 Repeated measures ANOVA revealed no difference between Stay (M = 43.66%) and 
Switch (M = 34.5%) conditions for proportion of regulating utterances relative to all meta-level 
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statements, F(1,15) = .580, p = .458. (See Table 7.) A Wilcoxon signed-rank test likewise 
showed no difference in proportion of regulating statements between Stay and Switch conditions, 
p = .484.  No interaction was found between condition and classroom for this variable, F(1,15) = 
2.328, p = .148, and using classroom as a between-subjects variable revealed no difference be-
tween groups, F(1,15) = .053, p = .820. 
 
Table 6. Individuals’ frequency of general, planning, and regulating meta-talk within intra-dyad 
discussion across Stay and Switch conditions 
 Frequency of general 
meta-talk utterances  
Frequency of planning 
utterances 
Frequency of regulating 
utterances 
Stay  5.59(3.29) 1.4(1.65) 2.6(2.34) 
    
Switch  2.55(2.34) .18(.50) 1.05(1.73) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table 7. Individuals’ proportion planning and regulating statements out of all intra-dyad meta-
talk across Stay and Switch conditions 
 Proportion of planning 
utterances 
Proportion of regulating utterances 
Stay  19.08%(21.7) 43.66%(29.6) 
   
Switch  4.24%(9.45) 34.5%(39.6) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
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Although these analyses showed no difference in proportion of regulating statements be-
tween conditions, it is important to note that this does not mean that frequency of regulating 
statements were identical across conditions (See Table 6). A repeated measures ANOVA shows 
that there is a significant difference in number of regulating statements made between Stay (M = 
2.6) and Switch (M = 1.05) conditions, F(1,20) = 7.042, p = .015, Cohen’s d = 0.79, with a Wil-
coxon signed-rank test also producing a significant result, p = .024. Regulating statements indeed 
are more frequent in the Stay condition, although the possibility remains that this difference is 
due only to the fact that there are more meta-level utterances overall in the Stay condition. The 
proportion of regulating statements does appear to increase (from Switch to Stay) in the expected 
general direction. In sum, nonetheless, it appears that where meta-level verbalization differed in 
form between Switch and Stay conditions was in the proportion of attention that students devoted 
to planning. See Table 8 for all results, including significance and effect sizes, for the repeated 
measures analysis of individuals’ intra-dyad meta-talk. 
 
Table 8. Results of all repeated measures analyses of individuals’ intra-dyad meta-talk. 





ta-talk 5.59 2.55 10.27 (1,20) .004 1.11 
       
Frequency planning 
utterances 1.40 0.18 8.463 (1,20) .009 1.23 
       
Frequency regulating  2.60 1.05 7.042 (1,20) .015 .79 
       
Proportion planning 19.08% 4.24% 6.74 (1,15) .02 .96 
       
Proportion regulating  43.66% 34.50% 0.58 (1,15) .458 .23 
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 Comparison of classes for Topic 2. As a secondary form of analysis of the difference be-
tween conditions, independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare meta-level utterances 
within dialogs conducted in Stay versus Switch conditions for each topic cycle. For the Topic 2 
cycle, 26 Class A students (13 pairs) were audio-recorded in the Stay condition, while 20 Class B 
students (10 pairs) were audio-recorded in the Switch condition.  
 Preliminary exploration revealed non-normal distributions for most of the variables of 
interest. Again, neither square root transformations (for count data) nor arcsin transformations 
(for proportion data) succeeded in normalizing the distributions. Although t-tests are considered 
robust to non-normality, particularly given samples greater than 30, nonparametric Mann-
Whitney U tests were conducted in addition to the parametric comparisons to corroborate the t-
tests.  
 Frequency of meta-level utterances was greater in the Stay (M = 5.42) than in the Switch 
(M = 3.90) conditions, but an independent samples t-test fell short of statistical significance, 
t(44) = 1.51, p = .138. Similarly, a Mann-Whitney U test revealed a marginal but nonsignificant 
difference between the two conditions, p = .072. (See Table 9.) 
 
Table 9. Comparison during Topic 2 of Stay versus Switch conditions: frequency of general, 
planning, and regulating meta-talk during intra-dyad discussion 
 Frequency of meta-
talk utterances  
Frequency of planning 
utterances 
Frequency of regulating 
utterances 
Stay (N = 26) 5.42(3.45) 1.42(1.58) 2.31(1.93) 
    
Switch (N = 20) 3.9(3.31) .85(1.31) 1.1(1.21) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
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 An independent samples t-test revealed no significant difference in proportion of plan-
ning statements relative to all meta-level utterances for Stay (M = 22.83%) and Switch (M 
=15.05%) conditions, t(43) = 1.199, p = .237 (See Table 10.) A Mann-Whitney U test also re-
vealed no significant difference between the two conditions on this variable, p = .202.  Frequen-
cy of planning statements (measured as a simple count) also did not differ significantly between 
Stay (M = 1.42) and Switch (M =  .85) according to an independent samples t-test, t(44) = 1.312, 
p = .196, and according to a Mann Whitney U test, p = .121.  
 An independent samples t-test did reveal a significant difference in proportion of regulat-
ing statements relative to all meta-level utterances for Stay (M = 48.96%) and Switch (M = 
26.00%) conditions, t(43) = 2.63, p = .012, Cohen’s d = 0.81, with students in the Stay condition 
producing a higher proportion of regulating statements than students in the Switch condition. 
(See Table 10.) A Mann-Whitney U test also revealed a significant difference between the two 
conditions on this variable, p = .015.  It is also worth noting that simple frequency of regulating 
statements did differ significantly between Stay (M = 2.3) and Switch conditions (M = 1.1), 
t(42.446) = 2.592, p = .013, Cohen’s d = 0.75, even though frequency of general meta-talk did 
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Table 10. Topic 2 comparison of Stay versus Switch conditions: proportion planning and regulat-
ing utterances out of all intra-dyad meta-talk  
 Proportion of planning 
utterances 
Proportion of regulating utterances 
Stay (N = 26) 22.83%(21.2) 48.96%(31.27) 
   
Switch  
(N = 19) 
15.04%(22.02) 26.00%(25.31) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
 Comparison of classes for Topic 3: Next, the same independent samples t-tests were con-
ducted to compare meta-level utterances within dialogs conducted in Stay versus Switch condi-
tions for Topic 3. At this time point, 18 Class A students (nine pairs) were audio-recorded in the 
Switch condition, while 10 Class B students (five pairs) were audio-recorded in the Stay condi-
tion. Again, preliminary exploration revealed a non-normal distribution for most of the variables 
of interest, so Mann-Whitney U tests were performed in addition to t-tests. 
  First, an independent samples t-test revealed a significant difference in frequency of 
overall meta-level statements in the Stay condition (M = 4.4) versus the Switch condition (M = 
1.89), t(26) = 2.632, p = .014, Cohen’s d  = 1.08, with students in the Stay condition producing 
more meta-level statements than students in the Switch condition. A Mann-Whitney U test like-
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Table 11. Topic 3 comparison of Stay versus Switch conditions: frequency of general, planning, 
and regulating meta-talk during intra-dyad discussion 
 Frequency of meta-
talk utterances  
Frequency of planning 
utterances 
Frequency of regulating 
utterances 
Stay (N = 10) 4.40(2.91) .60(.84) 2.8(2.66) 
    
Switch (N = 18) 1.89(2.11) .11(.32) .89(1.23) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
 Next, independent samples t-tests revealed no significant difference in proportion of 
planning utterances relative to all meta-level utterances between the Stay (M = 13.3%) and 
Switch (M = 11.36%) conditions, t(19) = .169, p = .867, and no significant difference in propor-
tion of regulating utterances relative to all meta-level utterances between the Stay (M = 54.5%) 
and Switch (M = 47.7%) conditions, t(19) = .45, p = .657. Mann-Whitney U tests likewise re-
vealed no significant differences on either of these variables, p = .512 for planning, and p = .654 
for regulating. (See Table 12.) 
 
Table 12. Topic 3 comparison of Stay versus Switch conditions: proportion planning and regulat-
ing utterances out of all intra-dyad meta-talk  
 Proportion of planning 
utterances 
Proportion of regulating utterances 
Stay (N = 10) 13.3%(2.06) 54.5%(26.57) 
   
Switch  
(N = 11) 
11.36%(3.03) 47.7%(40.18) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
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 The secondary analyses, with their restricted Ns and hence reduced power, produced re-
sults that were generally consistent with the more direct within-subject comparisons across con-
ditions.  (The secondary analyses, it is worth noting, were also generally consistent when sample 
size was restricted further by making the comparison at the level of the dyad rather than the indi-
vidual.)  In sum, the intra-dyad analyses indicate that overall the Stay condition was more pro-
ductive than the Switch condition with respect to meta-level talk that served to coordinate the 
pair’s activity through functions such as planning, a forward-looking function, and regulation, a 
more immediate and directive function.  Although the within-subject and between-subject anal-
yses do not yield entirely consistent results regarding individual meta-level functions, there ex-
ists some evidence that both planning and regulation are more prevalent in the Stay than in the 
Switch condition.  
 Average length of meta-talk episodes, Topics 2 and 3.  A final set of independent samples 
t-tests was conducted to identify any difference between Stay and Switch conditions in average 
length of meta-level episodes. Episodes consisted of at least one initiating meta-level utterance, 
and each subsequent meta-level utterance that was explicitly relevant to the initiating statement 
was counted toward the total length of the episode. During Topic 2, no significant difference was 
found in average meta-level episode length between Stay (M = 1.55) and Switch (M = 1.65) 
conditions, t(21) = -.315, p = .756. This result was corroborated by a Mann-Whitney U test, p = 
.605. 
 During Topic 3, an independent samples t-test likewise showed no significant difference 
in average meta-level episode length between Stay (M = 1.78) and Switch (M = 1.38) conditions, 
t (9)= 1.524, p = .162. A Mann-Whitney U test also revealed no significant difference between 
conditions on this variable, p = .177.  
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Table 13. Results of all t-tests comparing intra-dyad meta-talk in Stay versus Switch conditions 
(Topics 2 and 3). 
  Stay (Class A)  Switch (Class 






5.42 3.90 1.51 44 .138 .46 




1.42 0.85 1.31 44 .196 .40 
       
Frequency 
regulating  2.31 1.10 2.59 42.5 .13  .75 
       
Proportion 
planning  22.83% 15.04% 1.20 43 .237 .37 
       
Proportion 
regulating  48.96% 26.00% 2.63 43 
 
.012  .81 




1.55 1.65 -.315 21 .756 -.125 
        
  Stay (Class B) Switch (Class 






4.40 1.89 2.63 26 .014  1.08 
       
Frequency 
planning  0.60 0.11 1.76 10.50 
 
.107 .91 
       
Frequency 
regulating 2.80 0.89 2.15 11.2 
 
.054  1.07 
       
Proportion 
planning  13.3% 11.36% 0.17 19 .867 .78 
       
Proportion 
regulating  54.5% 47.7% 0.45 19 .657 .21 
       
Average length 1.78 1.38 1.52 9 .162 .942 






Coding of electronic discourse with opposing pairs 
 Next, electronic dialogs were examined for differences in task performance between pairs 
participating in the Stay condition and pairs participating in the Switch condition. The dialogic 
coding scheme described by Felton and Kuhn (2001) was used. Felton and Kuhn’s scheme cap-
tures the functional relationship between utterances within a dialog to reveal whether interlocu-
tors attempt to weaken their opponents’ claims through some form of counterargument.  In addi-
tion to differences in strategic use of counterargument, it is also proposed that Stay dialogs may 
include more meta-level talk about the argument, since intra-dyad dialogs in the Stay condition 
were found to include more meta-talk than those in the Switch condition. It is possible that if 
Stay dyads express more meta-talk about argument norms and goals, these concerns may make 
their way into the dialogs themselves. 
 Coding the electronic dialogs entailed first segmenting each into idea units. An idea unit 
can be thought of as the written product of an attempt to make a single point. For example, 
“What if you lived in China, would you want the government to tell you how many children to 
have?” would constitute a single idea unit, whereas we would segment the following response 
into two units accordingly: “Well one we are not talking about us / and two if we did live there 
we would respect our government’s laws.” The author and another coder independently seg-
mented six arguments produced by a group of students from the same school undergoing the 
same curriculum but not in the present database, achieving 82% inter-rater agreement. The au-
thor then segmented all dialogs in the present database. During Topic 2, pairs expressed on aver-
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age 4.6 idea units per dialog (range 2-7); during Topic 3, pairs expressed 5.03 idea units per dia-
log (range 1-11).   
 Once dialogs were segmented, each idea unit — henceforth “utterance” — was assigned 
a code describing its function in relationship to the utterance preceding it. Our major concern 
here was with whether pairs made effective use of the counterargument strategy in response to 
their opponents’ claims. Felton and Kuhn’s scheme (2001) identifies the strategy of direct coun-
terargument (Counter-C), which seeks to directly critique an opponent’s claim. They further 
identify a less sophisticated counterargument strategy (Counter-A), through which the arguer 
disagrees with (and thereby acknowledges) the opponent’s claim, but presents an unrelated ar-
gument that does not address the opponent’s claim. Of course, arguers can fail to counter at all, 
instead changing the subject completely (coded Unconnected) or continuing to expound on their 
own previous point (coded Clarify). (See Tables 14 and 15 for examples.) The author and anoth-
er coder independently coded eight dialogs produced by a group of students from the same 
school undergoing the same curriculum, achieving 81% inter-rater agreement using Kuhn and 
Felton’s (2001) coding scheme. 
Table 14. Coded electronic dialog illustrating Counter-A, Counter-C 
Pair A We think that China shouldn’t have a one-child policy because the couples should 
be able to decide for themselves. In other words, democracy rules! 
Pair B We think that’s wrong because there are so many problems associated with over-
population. Counter-A  
  
Pair A We think that China shouldn’t have a one-child policy because the couples should 
be able to decide for themselves. In other words, democracy rules! 
Pair B China is not a democracy. Counter-C 
  
Pair A Obama has been a bad president because he has not encouraged gay marriage as a 
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law when he should because everyone should be entitled to love. 
Pair B But he has a lot more things to do. Counter-A / On top of that, it says in evidence 




Table 15. Coded electronic dialog illustrating Clarify 
Pair A We think that China shouldn’t have a one-child policy because the couples should 
be able to decide for themselves. In other words, democracy rules! 
Pair B We think that’s wrong because there are so many problems associated with over-
population. 
Pair A But it’s the parents’ right to decide whether to have more than one child. Clarify 
 
 
 Next, as an overlay to Felton and Kuhn’s coding scheme, each utterance was analyzed in 
terms of whether it constituted meta-level talk. Within-dialog meta-talk addresses the quality or 
process of argumentation itself (“That is a weak argument”; “You guys aren’t showing evi-
dence”) as opposed to talk regarding the topic content (e.g., “The one-child policy is wrong be-
cause…”). Further examples of meta-talk versus topic talk are provided in Table 16.  Coding 
eight transcripts produced by another cohort undergoing the same curriculum, the author and an-
other coder achieved 95.6% agreement regarding whether a statement constituted meta-talk.  
  
Table 16. Coded electronic dialog illustrating meta-talk versus non meta-talk 
  
Pair A Obama isn’t doing a good job because conditions in the US are bad.  
(NOT Meta) 
Pair B First of all, you should be more specific. (Meta) 
Pair A Since Obama was president debt has gone up. (NOT meta) 
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Pair B Even though the debt has gone up Obama has decreased unemployment rates. 
(NOT meta)  
Pair A But that’s just changing the subject. Please address our argument. (Meta) 
 
 
Analysis of electronic discourse with opposing pairs    
 As was the case with respect to intra-dyad dialogs, it was not possible to compare all Stay 
condition dialogs with all Switch condition dialogs, since the same students were involved in 
both conditions but in different pairings. Thus, a comparison was first made between the Stay 
condition in Class A and the Switch condition in Class B; then, a second comparison was made 
between the Switch condition in Class A and the Stay condition in Class B. This of course reduc-
es the number of participants in (and thus the power of) each analysis; however, it allows for a 
parametric statistical comparison of the conditions since no student appears twice in the same 
comparison.  The pair is the unit of analysis for these analyses since it was the pair who together 
produced the inter-dyad communications to an opponent dyad.  (For this reason, no repeated-
measures analysis across conditions was conducted.) 
 Comparisons of classes for Topic 2. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to com-
pare dialogs produced in Stay versus Switch conditions for Topic 2. The variables of interest 
were a) proportion of meta-level utterances relative to total utterances in the electronic dialog, b) 
frequency of Counter-C usage in response to counter opportunities (that is, to what proportion of 
opponents’ arguments did pairs respond with at least one direct Counter-C, and c) proportion of 
Counter-C usage relative to all counters (including both Counter-C and the less sophisticated 
Counter-A).  
 During this topic cycle, 32 Class A students (16 pairs) participated in the Stay condition, 
while 28 Class B students (14 pairs) participated in the Switch condition. Preliminary analyses 
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revealed a non-normal distribution of the data for these measures. Because it was not possible to 
normalize the distributions using an arcsin transformation, Mann-Whitney U tests were also con-
ducted to support the t-test results.  
 Dialogs were first examined with regard to proportion of utterances devoted to meta-level 
talk about the argument. An independent samples t-test revealed no significant difference in pro-
portion of meta-level utterances for Stay (M = 18.12%) versus Switch (M = 11.93%) conditions, 
t(28) = .94, p = .355. This result was supported by a Mann-Whitney U test, which also revealed 
no significant difference between the conditions on this variable, p = .355. (See Table 17.) 
 
Table 17. Topic 2 Comparison of Stay and Switch pairs’ electronic dialogs: proportion meta-talk 
out of all utterances 
  Proportion meta-talk  
Stay (N = 16)  18.12%(19.17)  
    
Switch (N = 14)  11.93%(16.53)  
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
   
 Next, dialogs were examined for differences in quality of argumentation, measured first 
in terms of the proportion of opportunities pairs took to respond to their opponents with a Coun-
ter-C. Opportunities include any instance when a pair’s opponent advanced a claim or countered 
the pair’s own claim (thus enabling rebuttal). A pair could receive no opportunities to counter if 
the opponent advanced no claims or counters (but instead only asked clarifying questions or re-
quested evidence, for example). On average, pairs in the Stay condition were presented with 3.3 
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opportunities to counter (range 2-6), while pairs in the Switch condition received 2.4 opportuni-
ties to counter (range 0-5).  
 An independent samples t-test revealed no significant difference in the proportion of ar-
guments to which Stay pairs (M = 45.00%) and Switch pairs (M = 39.7%) responded with a di-
rect Counter-C, t(27) = .510, p = .614. A Mann-Whitney U test likewise revealed no significant 
differences on this measure, p = .449. (See Table 18.)  
 A final independent samples t-test did, however, reveal a significant difference in propor-
tion of counters produced that were assigned the high Counter-C code (relative to all counterar-
guments, both Counter-A and Counter-C) between Stay (M = 80.07%) and Switch (M = 
49.55%), t(24) = 2.41, p = .024, Cohen’s d = 0.94. This result was also corroborated by a Mann-
Whitney U test, p = .027. (See Table 19.) 
 
Table 18.  Topic 2 Comparison of Stay and Switch pairs’ electronic dialogs: proportion of oppo-
nents’ arguments addressed with a Counter-C 
                    Arguments addressed with Counter-C 
Stay (N = 16)  45.00%(29.72) 
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Table 19. Topic 2 Comparison of Stay and Switch pairs’ electronic dialogs: proportion of coun-
terarguments coded Counter-C  
  Proportion counterarguments that were Counter-C 
Stay (N = 15)  80.07%(29.65) 
   
Switch (N = 11)  49.55%(34.79) 
 
 
 Comparisons of classes for Topic 3: A second and identical set of analyses was conduct-
ed for Topic 3. During this topic cycle, 32 Class A students (16 pairs) participated in the Stay 
condition, while 28 Class B students (14 pairs) participated in the Switch condition. Preliminary 
analyses again revealed a non-normal distribution of data, which could not be corrected via 
arcsin transformation; therefore, Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted once again. 
 Dialogs were, again, first examined with regard to proportion of utterances devoted to 
meta-level talk about the argument. An independent samples t-test revealed a significant differ-
ence in proportion of meta-level utterances for Stay (M = 25.93%) versus Switch (M = 8.19%) 
conditions, t(28) = 3.081, p = .005, Cohen’s d = 1.11, with pairs in the Stay condition producing 
a higher proportion of meta-level utterances than pairs in the Switch condition. A Mann-Whitney 
U test likewise revealed a significant difference in proportion of meta-level utterances between 
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Table 20. Topic 3 Comparison of Stay and Switch pairs’ electronic dialogs: proportion meta-talk 
out of all utterances  
 Proportion meta-talk 
Stay (N = 14) 25.93%(19.07) 
  
Switch (N = 16) 8.19%(12.12) 
  
 Next, pairs’ e-dialogs were examined for responsiveness to counter opportunities. This 
time, Stay pairs were presented with a mean of 2.75 opportunities to counter (range 1-5), while 
Switch pairs received 4.4 opportunities to counter (range 1-10). A difference in counter opportu-
nities between Stay and Switch pairs during Topic 3 may be attributable to the higher proportion 
of utterances categorized as meta-talk in Stay dialogs. Meta-level discussion does not necessarily 
invite a counter-level response unless that meta-talk includes a criticism that can be refuted (e.g., 
“There’s no evidence to support that”).  
An independent samples t-test revealed no significant difference in proportion of direct 
counterargument usage between Stay (M = 50.71%) versus Switch (M = 57.19%) conditions, 
t(28) = -.528, p = .602. A Mann-Whitney U test supported this result, revealing no significant 
difference between the conditions on this variable, p = .58. (See Table 21.) A final independent 
samples t-test revealed no significant difference in proportion of counters produced that were 
assigned the high Counter-C code (relative to all counters) between Stay (M = 65.50%) and 
Switch (M = 69.96%) conditions, t(28) = -.352, p = .727. This result was corroborated by a 
Mann-Whitney U test, p = .951. (See Table 22.) 
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Table 21. Comparison during Topic 3 of Stay and Switch pairs’ electronic dialogs: proportion of 
opponents’ arguments addressed with a Counter-C 
                    Arguments addressed with Counter-C 
Stay (N = 14)  50.71%(38.65) 
   
Switch (N = 16)  57.19%(28.35) 
 
 
Table 22. Comparison during Topic 3 of Stay and Switch pairs’ electronic dialogs: proportion of 
counterarguments coded Counter-C  
  Proportion counterarguments that were Counter-C 
Stay (N = 14)  65.50%(41.07) 
   
Switch (N = 16)  69.96%(27.77) 
 
 In sum, the results of the inter-dyad analyses do not yield an entirely consistent picture.  
All statistically significant comparisons, however, favor the Stay condition.  Most important, the 
Stay dyads produced a significantly greater proportion of meta-level utterances in Topic 3 dia-
logs than did the Switch dyads.  This difference was in the same direction but had not reached 
statistical significance in Topic 2, possibly because of an increasing awareness over time of the 
value of meta-talk (as reported by Kuhn, Zillmer, Crowell, & Zavala, 2013).  By Topic 3, the 
Stay group were thus better able to take advantage of their intra-dyad meta-talk and apply it to 
the inter-dyad communication than were the Switch group who, for Topic 3, lacked the ad-
vantage of their Same partner experienced in Topic 2 and were disrupted by the move to the 
Switch condition.  Supporting this interpretation is the fact that meta-level talk increased from 
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Topic 2 to Topic 3 for the Switch-to-Same group but decreased from Topic 2 to Topic 3 for the 
Same-to-Switch group (see Tables 17 and 20).  (Similarly consistent with this picture are the re-
sults for intra-dyad talk presented previously; for the Switch-to-Same group intra-dyad meta-talk 
increased slightly from Topic 2 to 3, from 3.90 to 4.40, whereas for the Same-to-Switch group it 
decreased dramatically, from 5.42 to 1.89.) 
The remaining analyses, however, do not yield a consistent picture.  In Topic 2, Same 
dyads were more likely to use the stronger Counter-C when they undertook to counter their op-
ponents than were Switch dyads.  This difference, however, was not replicated in Topic 3, 
which showed no difference.  Hence, in sum, there was evidence of students in the Stay condi-
tion successfully extending their increased intra-dyad meta-talk to the inter-dyad electronic dia-
logs, more so than students in the Switch condition.  There was no consistent evidence, howev-
er, that this success extended to the argument strategies themselves employed in the inter-dyad 
dialogs. 
 
Table 23. Results of all t-tests comparing meta-talk and counter usage in electronic dialogs in 
Stay versus Switch conditions during Topics 2 and 3. 
  Stay (Class 
A)  
Switch (Class 




talk 18.12% 11.93% 0.94 28 .36 .346 





45.00% 39.7% 0.51 27 .61 .189 




80.07% 49.55% 2.41 24 .024  .944 
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  Stay (Class 
B) 
Switch (Class 




talk 25.93% 08.19% 3.08 28 .005  1.11 





50.71% 57.19% -.528 28 .602 -.19 




65.50% 69.96% -.352 28 .727 -.127 
 
 
Analysis of Same-Gender versus Mixed-Gender pairs 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Stay condition (during both Topic 2 and Topic 3) includ-
ed nearly all same-gender pairs, while a majority of pairs in the Switch condition (for both top-
ics) consisted of one female and one male student. Differences in performance between Stay and 
Switch pairs could therefore potentially be attributable to this difference in the gender composi-
tion of pairs, rather than to the development of relationships between partners in the Stay condi-
tion. For this reason, we compared all mixed-gender pairs in the Switch condition with all same-
gender pairs in the Switch condition. Pair-level data were examined in terms of intra-dyad meta-
talk, including frequency of meta-level utterances and frequency of planning and regulating 
statements. 
 An independent samples t-test revealed no difference in frequency of meta-level state-
ments within same-gender pairs (M = 5.7) versus mixed-gender pairs (M = 6.0), t(17) = -.104, p 
= .919. Neither were any differences found in frequency of planning statements within same-
gender pairs (M = 1.14) versus mixed-gender pairs (M = .92), t(17) = .267, p = .792. These two 
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results were corroborated by a Mann-Whitney U test, p = .427 (for general meta-talk), and p = 
.580 (for planning statements). Finally, both types of pairs averaged exactly two (M = 2.0) regu-
lating statements per conversation. Using individuals as the unit of analysis (and thus increasing 
the power of the test) produced the same results. 
 A handful of students (all girls, n = 7) participated in same-gender pairings in both the 
Stay and Switch conditions. Thus, it was asked whether frequency of these particular individu-
als’ meta-talk varied depending on condition. This would lend support to the abovementioned 
test and would suggest a benefit to length of partnership above and beyond that conferred by 
working with a same-gender partner. A repeated measures analysis of these individuals’ talk re-
vealed a significant difference in frequency of overall meta-level utterances between Stay (M = 
6.7) and Switch (M = 1.4) conditions, p = .044, Cohen’s d = 1.51. There was a marginal differ-
ence in frequency of planning statements between Stay (2.28) versus Switch (.29) conditions, p = 
.08, Cohen’s d = 1.21, and a significant difference in frequency of regulating statements between 
Stay (2.43) versus Switch (.143) conditions, p = .047, Cohen’s d = 1.31. 
  
Table 24. Comparison of same-gender and mixed-gender pairs’ intra-dyad conversation in the 
Switch condition 
 Frequency of meta-
level utterances  
Frequency of planning 
utterances 
Frequency of regulating 
utterances 
Same-gender  
(n = 7) 
5.71(7.45) 1.14(1.77) 2.00(2.77) 
    
Mixed-gender  
(n = 12) 
6.00(4.63) .92(1.78) 2.00(2.04) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
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Analysis of Asymmetry between Partners  
 Finally, no predictions were made regarding potential asymmetry in meta-level talk be-
tween partners; however, it is worth considering whether asymmetry exists or could develop be-
tween partners over time, since actively producing meta-talk may be of greater benefit to devel-
oping argument skill than being the passive recipient of such talk (Shaenfield, 2009).  Two ques-
tions are of interest. First, it was asked whether asymmetry appears to develop as a function of 
time spent together: Did Stay or Switch pairs exhibit greater asymmetry? Secondly, it was asked 
whether any significant asymmetry in meta-level talk exists between partners within mixed-
gender pairs.  
 Comparison between Stay and Switch pairs in degree of asymmetry between partners’ 
meta-talk. To examine whether Stay pairs exhibited greater asymmetry in meta-talk than Switch 
pairs, the absolute value of the difference between partners in frequency of meta-talk was calcu-
lated for each pair. Independent samples t-tests revealed no difference in this number between 
Stay (M = 2.5) and Switch (M = 1.8) pairs, t(21) = .853, p = .413, for Topic 2; nor was any sig-
nificant difference found between Stay (M = 2.0) and Switch (M = .89) pairs, t(12) = 1.17, p = 
.293, for Topic 3. 
 Comparison of males’ and females’ meta-talk in mixed-gender pairs. Also of potential 
interest is whether, within mixed-gender pairs, any asymmetry emerged between males and fe-
males with regard to frequency of meta-level talk. In this context, did either boys or girls tend to 
take the reins with regard to managing a dyad’s adherence to task goals? Using audio data from 
all mixed-gender dyads in the Switch condition (n = 12 pairs), a paired samples t-test revealed no 
differences in overall meta-talk frequency between girls (M = 3.0) and boys (M = 2.9), t(11) = -
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.29, p = .777. We also found no difference between girls (M = .50) and boys (M = .25) in fre-
quency of planning statements, t(11) = .10, p = .339, and no significant difference between girls 
(M = .75) and boys (M = 1.17) in frequency of regulating statements, t(11) = 1.8, p = .096. It is 
worth noting that differences between girls and boys may not yet be evident at the beginning 
stages of collaborative partnership, and that if we had been able to observe mixed-gender pairs in 
the Stay condition, such differences could have emerged. 
 Test for correlation between asymmetry in meta-talk and e-dialog performance. The the-
oretical assumptions motivating this study suggest that roughly equally capable students engage 
in a dialectical process whereby they internalize shared talk about task goals, each child taking 
the role of student or teacher interchangeably as understanding is negotiated. Students were thus 
randomly partnered, rather than matched (or mismatched) by ability level, with the expectation 
that the majority of pairs should be advantaged by the Stay condition. The analyses examining 
differences between conditions appear to confirm this expectation. Yet, it is possible that differ-
ences in performance (particularly counterargument use) by condition may have been produced 
by pairs in which one student was initially more skilled or more metacognitively verbal than the 
other.Thus, it was asked whether strategic performance on the electronic dialog task was associ-
ated with degree of asymmetry in meta-talk between partners.  For Topic 2, Pearson r correla-
tions detected no association between asymmetry and e-dialog meta-talk, r = .141, p = .521, be-
tween asymmetry and proportion of opponents’ arguments countered, r  = -.176, p = .434, or be-
tween asymmetry and proportion of counters assigned the Counter-C code, r = -.101, p = .662.  
 Pearson r correlations likewise revealed no associations between asymmetry in intra-dyad 
meta-talk and e-dialog meta-talk, r = .385, p = .174, between asymmetry and proportion oppo-
   
 70 
nents’ arguments countered, r = -.083, p = .777, or between asymmetry and proportion of coun-


























 The present study asked whether, in the context of learning to argue, collaborating dyad-
members scaffold one another’s meta-level development through regulatory conversation that 
evolves over time. The results support the claim that amount and quality of meta-talk between 
collaborators may be affected by the time they spend together developing an intersubjective, 
working relationship. In the following section I discuss the principal findings and their implica-
tions, followed by limitations and areas for future research. 
 
Principal findings 
 It was hypothesized that as intersubjectivity (i.e., shared understanding of goals) develops 
between collaborators, meta-level language may become more frequent and increasingly sophis-
ticated, moving from surface-level task division or simple evaluative expressions to more sub-
stantive expressions seeking to direct the dyadic activity in accord with discourse norms. Thus, 
students who work together for several sessions should exhibit more frequent and more regulato-
ry meta-talk than students who are new to working together. It was further hypothesized that, 
since more frequent meta-talk predicts higher performance in an argument task (Shaenfield, 
2009), we would expect students who work together longer to exhibit higher performance. 
 During each of two topic cycles (of a total of four) within the second year of a two-year 
argumentation curriculum (Kuhn, Hemberger, & Khait, 2016), conditions were manipulated so 
that half of students worked with a single partner over six sessions (Stay condition) while half 
worked with a succession of six different partners (Switch condition). Hypotheses were tested by 
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examining the sixth and final audio-recorded conversation of each dyad, along with each dyad’s 
sixth and final electronic dialog.  
 The primary analysis of audio-data (i.e., a repeated measures analysis of each individual 
with data from both topic cycles) supports the first hypothesis indicated above: Students made 
more frequent meta-level utterances in the Stay condition than in the Switch condition. Support-
ing our second hypothesis, meta-talk in the Stay condition focused to a greater degree on plan-
ning, a strategic, future-oriented form of talk that seeks to direct conversation according to antic-
ipated task demands.  
 Analyses directly comparing Stay and Switch pairs during Topics 2 and 3 (of four topics) 
also revealed more frequent meta-talk in the Stay condition, with a significant difference be-
tween conditions during Topic 3.  Differences were also noted in amount of talk seeking to direct 
the conversation, most markedly in terms of regulating — similar to planning but more tactical 
as a response to immediate task goals.  Contrary to the expectation that meta-talk would be more 
sustained among familiar pairs, meta-level episodes were no more lengthy in the Stay than the 
Switch condition. 
 Examining the archived electronic dialogs produced by Stay versus Switch pairs revealed 
that the former were more likely to inject meta-level discussion into the arguments they conduct-
ed with their opponents. The picture with regard to strategic skill, however, is less consistent, 
with Stay pairs outdoing Switch pairs with regard to strong counterargument skill (Counter-C) 
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Implications 
 The present study contends that same-age collaborators, through shared language, hold 
open a metacognitive space greater than either has the capacity to manage alone, and that that 
shared meta-level regulation evolves along with its participants’ understanding of its value and 
their developing strategic skill. This proposition originates in Vygotsky's views of a bi-
directional zone of proximal development between interlocutors, wherein the participants enter 
the collaboration with their unique, respective understandings of the goals of their interaction, 
then negotiate and interiorize the coordination of those understandings.  One could argue that the 
hypotheses advanced in this study do not originate from a strict interpretation of Vygotskian the-
ory, since most traditional accounts assume that Vygotsky’s ZPD must be led by an adult or 
more capable peer.  Here, dyad-members were assigned to one another randomly (with no atten-
tion to partners’ respective ability levels), based on the assumption that both students may play 
the role of “more capable other” interchangeably. Certainly, there is a myriad of intellectual and 
behavioral dimensions to mastering any difficult task — from maintaining one’s attention, to re-
calling and evaluating strategies, to understanding the concepts involved — and dyad-members 
may enter their collaborative partnerships with varying degrees of capability on each dimension. 
In fact, each individual may display varying degrees of capability on any dimension over time 
(Siegler, 1996) or in response to specific contextual factors or task goals (Cole & Traupman, 
1981). This study contends that roughly equally capable peers may therefore have much to teach 
one another and may scaffold each other interchangeably throughout the duration of their inter-
action, each taking the role of student or teacher as needed and as each individual’s understand-
ing is continuously expressed and refined. 
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 The degree to which such a meta-level dialectic between partners evolves depends cru-
cially upon the contributions of each participant — and, we assert here, on the continuity of its 
constituent parts. This hypothesis had, until now, been investigated only in exploratory fashion, 
and not yet via any manipulation of collaborative circumstances. Early studies had been sugges-
tive: Forman and Cazden (1985) found that over several working sessions equally capable col-
laborators moved away from surface-level task negotiation and toward more sophisticated dis-
cussion of problem-solving strategies. Prior analysis of Kuhn’s argument curriculum (Kuhn et 
al., 2013) examined how meta-level talk propagates and changes as a class-wide phenomenon. 
This study contributes to the literature by manipulating the length of students’ time together and 
demonstrating that it matters. That is, where students have the opportunity to develop a working 
relationship with their partners, individuals are observed to engage in more frequent and more 
strategy-focused meta-regulatory talk.  
 Further, the data show that a majority of students benefited from staying with a partner — 
differences in favor of Stay were not limited to a subgroup of students: Of the 22 with audio-
recorded data in both conditions, just six were found not to exhibit more frequent meta-talk in 
the Stay condition. Of those six, three exhibited equal frequencies of meta-talk in the Stay and 
Switch conditions, and two of those showed an increased proportion of regulating meta-talk in 
Stay. The secondary analyses, contrasting Stay and Switch pairs at each time point, further cor-
roborates our reading of the repeated measures data. 
 The finding that students’ meta-talk was not more reciprocal in the Stay condition (as 
reflected in being more sustained) came as a surprise, particularly because in prior research 
(Kuhn et. al, 2013), meta-level episodes increased in length over time on the between-dyad elec-
tronic measure. When students respond to meta-talk with more meta-talk, each contributor re-
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ceives feedback regarding their metastrategic understanding; we had expected that with time, 
such reciprocal meta-level discourse would be more likely to occur. Potentially, this study’s 
measure of reciprocity may have been too fine an instrument; that is, meta episode length was 
calculated by counting any initiating meta-level utterance along with any directly relevant and 
contiguous meta-level utterances. It may be wise to eliminate the requirement that, to be counted 
toward an episode, follow-up statements should be immediately contiguous. Further, it may be 
worth including follow-up statements that are highly relevant to the initiating statement but do 
not strictly qualify as meta-talk — for example, clarifications or provisions of evidence when 
they are requested. Reanalyzing the data in this manner will require that inter-rater agreement be 
established in terms of which statements qualify as non-meta but still relevant to a preceding me-
ta-level statement. 
 The present study also demonstrates that, at least to some degree, between-dyad (elec-
tronic) meta-level discussion and counterargument use benefited from pair-members’ familiarity 
with one another.  Had the opposite been true (i.e., more meta-talk and more counter usage in the 
Switch e-dialogues), it might be asked whether the class-wide increases noted previously in both 
strategic skill and between-dyad meta-talk (Kuhn & Crowell, 2011; Kuhn et. al, 2013) are en-
couraged mainly through students’ introduction to a wide variety of perspectives. The theoretical 
implications of the actual results, however, instead suggest an important role for increasing inter-
subjectivity between continuous partners. Educators may maximize the benefit of collaboration 
by allowing students time to move beyond the initial challenges of collaboration (Barron, 2003) 
and into the more complex aspects of negotiating understanding of task demands. Of course, not 
all pairs will eventually move in that direction — some pairs may be intractable in their unwill-
ingness to work productively with one another, and some individuals may naturally dominate 
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their partners to an extent that precludes mutuality. Encouragingly, given that a majority of stu-
dents (and pairs) moved into this more complex territory, this does not appear to be the norm. It 
may also be encouraging that Stay partners engaged in far more talk in general (on average 70 
utterances versus 54 in Switch), perhaps suggesting increasingly friendly relations over time.  
 The present study’s results suggest that students can be trusted to negotiate their collabo-
rative relationships, even when personality conflict is a potential issue. Further, students can be 
trusted to manage regulation of each other’s meta-level understanding. No analyses in this study 
examined the extent to which individuals’ meta-level utterances could be considered “correct” or 
“useful.” However, even “incorrect” meta-talk (i.e., misidentifying a strategy or making an ill-
considered strategy suggestion) may be useful in that it may elicit helpful feedback from one’s 
partner. Any differences in strategic skill were observed to favor the Stay condition, where stu-
dents were more likely to address and attempt to direct strategies, suggesting that we perhaps 
need not be overly concerned about the effects of exposure to potentially “incorrect” meta-talk. 
 
 The following excerpts illustrate typical differences between Switch pairs, who must re-
establish intersubjectivity with a brand new partner during the observed session, and Stay pairs, 
who do not. First observe the following conversation between BR and her Switch partner (LS): 
 
Table 25. Audio-recorded dialog of BR and LS in the Switch condition. 
SPEAKER UTTERANCE 
BR This is bad cooperation over here. LS wants to type on the computer but I wan-
na type first. I think I should go first because I was born first. 
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BR I’m gonna bother LS; she’s gonna regret this. 
BR Wow LS, you use bad evidence badly. (May be joking since electronic dialog 
seems not to have begun.) 
BR I have a question do we have to write what’s in evidence “blah blah blah” (ask-
ing teacher). 
 (Remainder of conversation is off-task.) 
 
 
 In the Switch condition, BR’s only on-task utterances concern surface-level task division, 
a (likely jocular) warning of potential communication issues, and a (likely also jocular) comment 
on her partner’s performance. In no instance does her partner verbally respond to or initiate any 
on-task talk, meta-level or otherwise. Further, note that BR and LS have already experienced six 
topic cycles (but not together), since all of our participants were in the second year of this curric-
ulum. Yet, BR requests the teacher’s input as to a procedure she would have engaged in many 
times already. The associated task goals, therefore, are by no means “old hat,” and BR is not be-
yond benefiting from the input of a collaborator. Contrast this with BR’s conversation with her 
Stay partner (JP) from the prior cycle: 
 
Table 26. Audio-recorded dialog of BR and JP in the Stay condition. 
SPEAKER UTTERANCE 
BR (Reading what JP wrote.) “We think the law should stay the same because 
the mother…” Wait, that doesn’t make sense no offense. 
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JP Well then you type it. 
BR No, why did you do that? That doesn’t make any sense: “We think the law 
should stay the same because the mother could have multiple births.” One 
birth policy… one birth! 
JP No, it says on the thingy … You can have one birth to both children. 
 (Pair argues for several utterances over what’s explained on the evidence 
sheet, then resolve the meaning with an appeal to the teacher.) 
  
BR (Referring to a new argument.) What? Why would we write this down? How 
does this help us?  
JP Cause they said not everyone wants twins or triplets. 
  
BR You see we shoulda written not everyone wants multiple births anyway; 
some people just want one child. So what could they possibly write? 
BR You know we’re not talking right now? What could we write? Think, think. 
JP They’re probably gonna say that they might have pain and bloating… 
BR But we can say that only 5% of women have that. 
  
BR Well … I don’t think we have any evidence for this one. Except for back-
ground knowledge, right JP? 
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BR What else can we write? Ooh, I got it JP. 




 BR’s Stay dialog with JP, contrasted with her Switch dialog, is notable first for its sheer 
number of both general and meta-level utterances (of which many have been omitted). Whereas 
in Switch BR gives up quickly on trying to engage her partner, here she presses JP to respond to 
her concerns rather than letting JP off the hook. She declines to take JP up on her offer to simply 
cede control (“No, why did you that?”) and forces JP to externalize her reasoning (How does this 
help us?”). BR encourages planning (“What could they possibly write … What could we 
write?”) and regulates JP’s effort and attention to the task (“Think, think.”). JP appears to be the 
less dominant of the pair; however, for her part, JP responds to BR’s meta-level concerns about 
sense-making (“It says on the thingy [evidence sheet]”), and, when pressed, engages in debate 
about the meaning of a piece of evidence. She herself enforces the pair’s adherence to an im-
portant argument norm (“We have to wait for the evidence.”). Thus, despite some personality-
related challenges (apparent from the full transcript) the two partners engage in mutual regula-
tion. BR’s dominance does not limit JP’s meta-level engagement; rather, it seems to encourage 
it. 
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Table 27. Audio-recorded dialog of JP and AH in the Switch condition. 
SPEAKER UTTERANCE 
JP Did they answer my questions? Did you guys answer my questions? Oh they 
did it’s question number 37!  
AH Oh I remember that one. Calm yourself, woman. 
JP I’m not gonna. 
AH Who are we against? 
JP I don’t understand this. 
AH You’re impatient. 
JP I'm not impatient. I just don’t like to wait. 
AH It’s called being impatient. 
JP No it’s not. 
JP What if we say something bad back? Do we get points off? 
AH No we don’t. We just get a bad reputation. 
 (A long interval with no conversation.) 
JP Let me get evidence # …. 
 
 
 The above excerpt contains the entirety of this pair’s meta-level engagement. There are, 
at best, some nominal attempts at behavioral regulation, where AH tells JP to “calm down” or to 
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have patience, but these attempts do not appear in service of specific task goals. JP’s questions 
(“What if we say something bad back? Do we get points off?”) reveal that she still requires the 
input of a collaborator in defining those goals — even at this late stage in the curriculum and af-
ter having engaged in highly regulatory collaborative talk with her earlier Stay partner. 
 Finally, JP appears to be the less dominant of this pair as well. However, AH does not yet 
provide any focused, regulatory support; nor does she compel JP to explain her thinking at any 
point during the conversation. Now, contrast the above discussion with AH’s Stay conversation 
with MO: 
 
Table 28. Audio-recorded dialog of AH and MO in the Stay condition. 
SPEAKER UTTERANCE 
AH So let’s talk about what argument we wanna use. 
MO Okay, I think the one child policy should be allowed because  of the re-
sources. Water is very essential and runs out … as the population grows …  
AH I was thinking, adding on to what you said … you could run out of space. 
AH And today we’re supposed to use — we’re gonna try to use a new argument, 
so what do you think we should — 
MO Let me see the evidence sheet. 
  
MO (After opponent writes.) Okay, so what should we say in response? 
AH I’m not sure what we should say to that. 
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MO Well, lemme see. Um, you could put like an evidence that there is like over-
population in China. And that’s why things like this happen because they’re 
like desperate. Or look for evidence that — 
AH  — They’re not always killed. 
MO Ohh… so the point is they’re scared so they kill the child? 
AH Yeah, but mostly they don’t kill the boys they kill the girls … 
  






 In the above excerpt, AH and MO attend to specific task goals and extend one another’s 
thinking. It is clear from this conversation that AH is capable of engaging in mutual meta-talk 
about task goals; this was not yet apparent in her Switch conversation with JP, perhaps because 
the two were just beginning to negotiate their collaborative relationship. 
 It was earlier suggested that the presence of intra-dyad meta-talk may benefit pairs’ op-
ponents if that meta-talk also appears in their electronic dialogs. The following excerpt provides 
an example of a Stay pair whose intra-dyad talk contained a relatively high frequency of meta-
level statements — several referencing specific argument norms — and whose electronic dis-
course reflects their meta-level concerns. 
 




Table 29. Audio-recorded dialog of EP and RA in the Stay condition. 
SPEAKER UTTERANCE 
  
EP We should look at some evidence 
RA There’s a lot of stuff that could help us … I’m gonna get question 3. 
  
RA What do you wanna write? 
EP We need to find some evidence. We can’t deny the 4-2-1 problem so we have 
to come up with something that makes it not matter. 
  
EP We just essentially looked at some evidence that helped us. 
RA We just boomed them back to a different race. 
EP And now we’re going to include this argument in an improvement of the pre-
vious counter where we didn’t really address what they said.  
 
 
 RA and EP speak often of evidence during their intra-dyad discussion — about its im-
portance in general and about the meaning and application of specific pieces of evidence. The 
following excerpt of their electronic discourse illustrates their attempt to use evidence (as Y2), as 
well as the pair’s concern with holding their opponent to the same norm (“Unwarranted.”). 




Table 30. Electronic dialog produced by RA and EP (as Pair Y2) in the Stay condition. 
PAIR UTTERANCE 
N6 But there is a 4-2-1 problem that states that the 1 child has to support 2 parents 
and 4 grandparents. 
Y2 However since the one child policy began, many problems that come with 
overpopulation have become less severe. There have been fewer epidemics, 
improvements in health services, education, housing, law enforcement, and the 
environment. (Evidence question 4) 
N6 OK but there would also be more jobs open that many people won’t apply to so 
there would be less jobs that help support the economy. 
Y2 Unwarranted. And it would be better to have more open jobs so that it would be 
easier for a person to find a job. 
 
 
 It is clear from their audio-recorded intra-dyad talk that EP recognizes the pair did not 
explicitly weaken their opponent’s initial argument (“we didn’t really address what they said”). 
EP’s comment that they should improve their counter likely referred to the reflection sheet meant 
for this purpose. While this meta-level concern does not appear in the argument itself, RA may 
still benefit from EP’s identification of the problem.  
 In the following excerpt, Stay pair EG and AB also voice meta-level concerns about evi-
dence use, with EG encouraging AB to enforce their opponent’s adherence to this norm: 




Table 31. Audio-recorded dialog of EG and AB in the Stay condition. 
SPEAKER UTTERANCE 
EG You need to ask them for the evidence 
AB Which one? 




This concern then appears within the electronic dialog itself: 
 
Table 32. Electronic dialog produced by EG and AB (as Pair A1) in the Stay condition. 
Pair UTTERANCE 
J7 Adult trial is too harsh for the teens because in adult jail, people in jail are 
violent. This may change the way the teen act. It also may make crime worse. 
A1 Jail cannot be considered harsh because there is no reliable statistics that 
shows if either adult jail or juvi detention centers have more violence. So 
your statement can’t be proven. Evidence 25 and 12. 
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 Here the pair (as A1) enforces the evidence norm (“your statement can’t be proven”), in 
fact using a piece of provided evidence to do so. This exchange, first instigated when EG di-
rected his partner’s behavior, illustrates the potential for intra-dyad talk to benefit opponents at 
the meta-level. 
  
 The above excerpts illustrate the potential for pairs to engage meaningfully at a metacog-
nitive level when afforded enough time to develop an interactive relationship.  As suggested by 
this study’s statistical comparison of conditions, Stay partners in these exchanges are more likely 
to attend to and enforce specific task goals. Having yet to attain the same level of intersubjectivi-
ty, Switch partners focus to a greater degree on surface-level behavior management and task di-
vision — a necessary step, perhaps, on the way to achieving meta-level intersubjectivity – or 
they have yet to begin interacting productively at all. The exchanges seen here make plain the 
relative richness of opportunity for students to give or receive meta-level feedback from a partner 
with whom they are well acquainted, as well as the potential for the entire class to benefit (via 
the electronic discourse) at the meta-level. 
 
Limitations and future research 
 An arguable limitation of this study is that it consisted of a brief manipulation in the mid-
dle of a two-year curriculum. Why should one, in the span of a topic cycle, expect to see a differ-
ence in meta-level activity that meaningfully influences strategic skill, especially when prior 
analyses have showed significant strategic development only after two full years (Kuhn & Crow-
ell, 2011)? As Shaenfield showed in 2009, the documented gradual increase in strategic skill re-
sults in part from the intra-dyad regulatory talk that partners produce. It was clear in this study 
   
 87 
that keeping students together helped to ensure that this meta-talk happened; the two-year gains 
seen in prior analyses would perhaps be attenuated were we to adopt the Switch condition as a 
standard practice. In fact, it may be worthwhile in future research to keep pairs together even 
longer (and compare to a continuous Switch condition) to determine whether it produces addi-
tional benefit to strategic or meta-level skill. Shaenfield’s work has already demonstrated that 
dyads who stay together do continue to produce a comparable amount of meta-level speech 
throughout the span of three topic cycles, though his work did not include any comparison to a 
Switch condition. 
It may also be argued (in defense of the study’s design) that the slow increase in both 
within-argument meta-talk (Kuhn et. al, 2013) and strategic skill (Shaenfield, 2009; Kuhn & 
Crowell, 2011) is not necessarily a linear one, or one where we can pinpoint an expected turning 
point. Rather, as with the acquisition of any intellectual skill, development may occur in “over-
lapping waves” (Siegler, 1996) as students use multiple strategies of varying effectiveness until 
development is complete. In this case, one would therefore expect important cognitive work to 
be done within each topic cycle. 
 One might also be concerned that the extent to which a student produced meta-talk would 
depend - at least in part - on whether she or her partner tended to dominate discussion. Staying 
with a dominant partner could result in increasing asymmetry in meta-talk (with greater frequen-
cy of meta-talk among Stay pairs attributable only to the more dominant partners). Staying with a 
partner may then — for the less dominant dyad-member — have a negative effect on strategic 
skill. That said, there was no difference in asymmetry in meta-talk between Stay or Switch pairs 
at either time point, meaning that more time together did not promote asymmetry. Further, the 
repeated measures analysis found that a majority of students (73%) produced more meta-talk in 
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the Stay condition, while half of the remaining produced equal amounts in both conditions. This 
suggests that even when a student was the less dominant member of a Stay pair, she was still 
likely to benefit from (or at least would not be disadvantaged by) working in the Stay condition. 
Finally, it is important to note that no correlation was found between asymmetry in meta-talk be-
tween partners and pairs’ performance on the e-dialog task. This suggests that the greater coun-
terargument performance of Stay pairs (seen during Topic 2) was possible within partnerships 
where peers were roughly equally capable. If better counterargument performance was com-
pelled by a higher quantity or higher quality meta-talk in Stay, it was not the result of some pairs 
being increasingly “led” by on more capable partner. This finding supports the contention that 
equally capable peers may form a zone of proximal development within which each partner may 
scaffold the other’s skill development.   
 
 It is also important to consider that the present study examines meta-talk only within the 
context of one domain (argumentation). One may ask whether the conclusions we draw about 
students’ behavior and performance should be limited, then, to this domain. However, the coding 
scheme developed here is arguably general enough to examine changes in meta-level regulation 
within other tasks. We have not specified the actual norms or behaviors that we expect students 
to enforce - only whether students regulate each other’s behaviors at all. That being said, it 
would be worthwhile in the future to conduct a more systematic analysis of which argument 
norms students enforce when they regulate each other’s behavior. Further, it would be of value to 
explore whether students do, in fact, regulate one another’s behavior when collaborating in other 
domains, and (for example, in math or science learning) what kinds of behaviors are monitored 
and enforced. We would anticipate increasing regulation between consistent partners in any do-
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main where mastery entails a high degree of metastrategic skill, and where students must negoti-
ate their understanding of task goals to get the job done. 
 It is also important to acknowledge that, since the participants in this study attended a 
moderately selective school focused on math, science, and engineering, these students may have 
started out with greater capability than the general population of middle schoolers. Thus, it is un-
clear whether the conclusions drawn here should be generalized to a broader population. Possi-
bly, a random sample of students (from a general population) would include greater variability in 
capability, and may thus include more pairs exhibiting greater asymmetry in capability; in that 
case, whether we would see an association between asymmetry and performance is unknown.  
 Finally, a major concern here is the potential confounding of two variables: that of part-
nership duration and the gender makeup of pairs. The two additional analyses (comparing same- 
and mixed-gender pairings and comparing individuals in Stay versus Switch) mitigate some of 
that concern. However, care should be taken in future research to ensure that all pairs (across 
conditions) consist of only same- or mixed-gender partners. It is encouraging (and perhaps unex-
pected) that, within the Switch condition, mixed- and same-gender pairs produced equal amounts 
of meta-talk, both generally and of the regulatory sort.  However, it would be important to learn 
whether this holds true over time and as partnerships mature. 
 
Conclusion: Dual Gains of Collaboration 
 It has been argued throughout this study that roughly equally capable peers may scaffold 
each other interchangeably throughout the duration of their interaction, and that this interactive 
shouldering of meta-level responsibility supports the strategic performance of the pair.  Certain-
ly, this study is concerned with understanding the conditions that enable effective interaction be-
   
 90 
tween students, given increasing use of collaboration as a method of classroom instruction. Ar-
guably, however, the ultimate goal is to effect lasting change of some kind in the individuals par-
ticipating. Through extended practice, we hope that students become proficient in the very act of 
collaborating — and can transfer this skill to new contexts — because their future educational 
and professional lives will demand it of them (Deming, 2015).  
 Perhaps even more importantly, it is expected that by engaging in mutually supportive 
collaborative argumentation, individuals gain self-regulatory control over their own adherence to 
argument goals; that is, they become individually more metacognitively aware of the demands of 
argumentation and capable of directing their own behavior accordingly. This study’s hypotheses 
assume that this is accomplished via interiorization – the driving inward – of shared regulatory 
language occurring between collaborators. Thus, an important next step would be to examine the 
effects of this manipulation on individuals’ self talk about adherence to argument goals. Devel-
opment of self-regulation should affect not only the exterior conversation between participants 
but also the “intra-mental” private talk of each. Verbal self-regulation was not commonly ob-
served in this study, perhaps because students were explicitly asked to discuss and agree on, ra-
ther than divvy up, the work that needed to be done. It would therefore be worthwhile, in follow-
up research, to conduct a post-manipulation one-on-one argument task (again, using a computer), 
but this time asking individuals to “think aloud” while they work. One might expect differences 
in terms of the kinds of self-talk students express, depending on whether individuals had recently 
participated in the Stay or Switch condition, or correlated with the type of regulatory speech that 
characterized their collaborations.  
 Finally, and most importantly, self-regulation should ultimately be directly evident in 
terms of strategic performance on the argument task itself.  For a given topic cycle, one might 
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expect that frequency of individuals’ counterargument and evidence use — both previously ob-
served to increase after dyadic argument practice (Kuhn & Crowell, 2011; Kuhn & Moore, 2013) 
— should vary on a post-manipulation one-on-one task, depending upon students’ assigned con-
ditions, or, again, correlated with the meta-level language characterizing their paired work. 
 
Final thoughts 
 We see students’ mastery of the task demands inherent to argumentive discourse as ger-
mane to their achievement of intellectual goals both empirically supported by developmental re-
search and embodied in our society’s stated goals of education. That students be competent to 
carefully consider their own and others’ perspectives and to exert metacognitive control over this 
activity is necessary if they are to participate meaningfully in the dialectical pursuit of 
knowledge through which the world changes, intellectually, socially, and politically. While such 
achievements are increasingly valued as stated aims of education, they are arguably not actually 
embodied in an increasingly polarized societal discourse. Educators’ task is to prepare students 
to confront such discourse — to contribute to it flexibly and with the competence to change its 
course. This study contributes to a growing body of literature that suggests children may develop 
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Appendix A. Topics used during the argumentation curriculum  
 
1. A pair of students are misbehaving and disrupting the classroom; should a school board expel 
the misbehaving children or allow them to stay in the school?  
 
2. Should a family new to the US be allowed, for the one year that they will live in the US, to 
home-school their non-English-speaking child?  
 
3. A poor South American country is being invaded by one of its neighbors; should the US 
should help the invaded country or focus on its own problems at home? 
 
4. Should researchers be allowed to test potentially life-saving medications first on animals? 
 
5. Should people be allowed to sell their kidneys, or should this be illegal? 
 
6. Should China continue its one-child policy?  
 
7. Is Barack Obama doing a good job as president of the US?  
 
8. Should teens who commit serious crimes be tried under the adult justice system or in a sepa-
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Appendix C. Other-Side Reflection Sheets 
 
 
 
